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RE´SUME´
Cette the`se comporte trois essais sur les interactions sociales en sciences
e´conomiques. Ces essais s’inte´ressent a` la fois au coˆte´ the´orique qu’empirique des in-
teractions sociales. Le premier essai (chapitre 2) se concentre sur l’e´tude (the´orique
et empirique) de la formation de re´seaux sociaux au sein de petites e´conomies
lorsque les individus ont des pre´fe´rences homophilique et une contrainte de temps.
Le deuxie`me essai (chapitre 3) se concentre sur l’e´tude (principalement empirique)
de la formation de re´seau sociaux au sein de larges e´conomies ou` les comporte-
ment d’individus tre`s distants sont aproximativement inde´pendants. Le dernier
essai (chapitre 4) est une e´tude empirique des effets de pairs en e´ducation au sein
des e´coles secondaires du Que´bec. La me´thode structurelle utilise´e permet l’identi-
fication et l’estimation de l’effet de pairs endoge`ne et des effets de pairs exoge`nes,
tout en controˆlant pour la pre´sence de chocs communs.
Mots Cle´s : Interactions Sociales, Re´seaux Sociaux, Formation de Re´seaux,
Effets de Pairs
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ABSTRACT
This thesis includes three essays on social interactions in economics, both from
a theoretical and applied perspective. The first essay (chapter 2) focusses on the
(theoretical and empirical) study of a network formation process in small economies
characterized by the fact that individuals have homophilic preferences and a time
constraint. The second essay (chapter 3) is focussed on the study (mostly empirical)
of a network formation process in large economies characterized by the fact that
distant individuals have approximately independent behaviours. The last essay
(chapter 4) is an empirical study of peer effects in education for Quebec high-school
teenagers. The structural method used allows for the identification and estimation
of the endogenous peer effect and the exogenous peer effects, while controlling for
the presence of common shocks.
Keywords: Social Interactions, Social Networks, Network Formation,
Peer Effects
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- Arthur Conan Doyle, A Study in Scarlet
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AVANT-PROPOS
“The temptation to form premature theories upon
insufficient data is the bane of our profession.”
-Sherlock Holmes
Le manque de donne´es de qualite´ est un des principaux proble`mes de l’e´tude des
inte´ractions sociales. La difficulte´ d’interpre´ter correctement les donne´es disponibles
en est un autre. Les chapitres qui suivent tentent surmonter certains de´fis impose´s
par ces proble`mes. Il reste ne´anmoins beaucoup de travail a` faire. Je reste persuade´
qu’une meilleure compre´hension des phe´nome`nes e´conomiques sous-jacents est la
cle´ vers la re´solution de nombreux proble`mes d’origine statistique.
1CHAPITRE 1
INTRODUCTION
Ces dernie`res anne´es, la lite´rature the´orique et empirique sur les interactions
sociales et les re´seaux sociaux en e´conomique a pris beaucoup d’importance. Dans
cette the`se, je m’inte´resse a` deux branches de cette lite´rature : l’estimation des
effets de pairs, et l’estimation des processus de formation de re´seaux sociaux.
Afin de faciliter la discussion, j’introduis les trois objets suivants : (y,X,G),
pour une population compose´e de n individus. Le vecteur y, de taille n×1 repre´sente
une variable endoge`ne potentiellement sujette a` des effets de pairs (e.g. habitudes
alimentaires, re´sultats scolaires...). La matrice X, de taille n × k repre´sente une
se´rie de k variables exoge`nes (e.g. age, genre, revenu, groupe racial...). Finalement,
la matrice G, de taille n× n est une matrice (syme´trique) d’adjacence donnant la
structure d’un re´seau social. Si deux individus i et j sont lie´s, alors Gij = 1. Dans le
cas contraire, Gij = 0. L’estimation des effets de pairs se concentre principalement
sur l’e´tude et l’estimation de P(y|X,G) alors que l’estimation des processus de
formation de re´seaux sociaux s’inte´resse principalement a` P(G|X).1
Effets de Pairs
Une des proble´matiques avec l’estimation de P(y|X,G) est d’identifier les effets
de pairs des potentiels chocs communs. Supposons que la population de taille n peut
eˆtre re´pare´e en diffe´rents groupes inde´pendants et conside´rons la forme structurelle
suivante (issue de Bramoulle´ et al., 2009) pour le groupe r :
yr = αr + Xrβ + G˜rXrγ + λG˜ryr + εr
ou` G˜r est construit a` partir de Gr en normalisant la somme de chaque ligne a` 1.
Une me´thode classique de controˆler pour l’effet fixe αr et de contourner le proble`me
1ou` P repre´sente la densite´.
2cause´ par la pre´sence du parame`tre fortuit αr (“incidental parameter problem”,
Newman et Scott, 1948) est de re´e´crire le mode`le en de´viations.
(I−Mr)yr = (I−Mr)Xrβ+λ(I−Mr)G˜ryr+(I−Mr)G˜rXrγ+(I−Mr)εr (1.1)
ou` Mr est une matrice carre´e syme´trique telle que la somme de chaque ligne est
normalise´e a` 1.
Dans ce cas, l’identification des parame`tres β, λ, γ est loin d’eˆtre triviale. De
plus, l’estimation est complique´e par la pre´sence de la variable endoge`ne G˜ryr (“re-
flection problem”, Manski, 2003). Pour un re´seau arbitraire, Bramoulle´ et al. (2009)
montent que l’identification est possible si les matrices I, G˜, G˜2 sont line´airement
inde´pendantes. Dans le cas spe´cifique ou` le re´seau repre´sente des interactions en
groupes (le re´seau est comple`tement connecte´ pour chaque groupe r), Lee (2007)
de´veloppe un estimateur par maximum de vraisemblance base´ sur la forme re´duite
de (1.1). C’est cet estimateur qui est utilise´ dans le chapitre 4.
Formation du Re´seau
La proble´matique principale en ce qui a trait a` l’e´tude de P(G|X) est l’important
degre´ de de´pendance entre les observations. Par exemple, la probabilite´ que deux
individus cre´ent un lien d’amitie´ peut de´pendre des liens que chacuns ont. Donc,
en ge´ne´ral, P(G|X) 6= Πij:i<jP(Gij|X). Dans les chapitres suivants, je pre´sente
deux approches pour contourner ce proble`me. La premie`re approche (chapitre 2)
est base´e sur l’observation de plusieurs petites sous-e´conomies inde´pendantes. La
deuxie`me (chapitre 3) est base´e sur l’observation d’une large e´conomie et sur un
argument d’inde´pendence asymptotique.
Une autre proble´matique est de pouvoir mode´liser P(G|X) afin de re´pliquer les
faits stylise´s observe´s. J’utilise l’une des principales caracte´ristiques des re´seaux
sociaux : l’homophilie. L’homophilie caracte´rise le fait que deux individus lie´s sont
en moyenne davantage similaires que deux individus non lie´s. Dans le chapitre 2,
j’utilise une version forte de l’homophilie (l’homophilie structurelle) alors que dans
3le chapitre 3, j’utilise une forme tre`s faible de l’homophilie (l’homophilie asympto-
tique).
Trois Essais...
Cette the`se comprend trois essais (chapitres 2,3 et 4). Le premier essai intitule´
Structural Homophily s’inte´resse a` la formation de re´seaux d’amitie´ dans des e´coles
secondaires de taille relativement faibles, aux E´tats-Unis. Une des caracte´ristiques
de ces petites e´coles est que les individus connaissent l’ensemble de leurs amis
potentiels. Chaque individu a une contrainte de temps (inobserve´e) qui introduit
une limite quant au nombre possible d’amis qu’il peut avoir. Lorsque les indivi-
dus pre´fe`rent cre´er des liens avec des individus qui leurs sont similaires, l’unique
re´seau d’e´quilibre posse`de une structure extreˆmement particulie`re : l’homophilie
structurelle. Cette structure particulie`re permet de de´finir une me´thode d’estima-
tion originale. Je de´veloppe un estimateur permettant d’estimer les poids relatifs
de la contribution de diffe´rentes caracte´ristiques socioe´conomiques au processus de
formation du re´seau. Cet estimateur est base´ sur la maximization de la probabilite´
que le re´seau observe´ soit caracte´rise´ par l’homophilie structurelle. J’utilise une
base de donne´es ame´ricaine (AddHealth) contenant de l’information sur des ado-
lescents de niveau secondaire (“high-school”). Pour chaque adolescent, j’observe
son re´seau social ainsi que son groupe racial. Je trouve que le niveau de se´gre´gation
varie conside´rablement selon le groupe racial conside´re´, les noirs e´tant davantage
se´gre´gue´s que les autres groupes raciaux.
Le deuxie`me essai est intitule´ My Friend Far Far Away : Asymptotic Properties
of Pairwise Stable Networks.2 Comme pour l’essai pre´ce´dent, nous nous inte´ressons
a` P(G|X), mais maintenant, dans le cas ou` on observe l’unique re´seau d’e´quilibre
d’une tre`s vaste e´conomie. L’estimateur est base´ sur la maximisation de la proba-
bilite´ que le re´seau d’e´quilibre soit Pairwise Stable (Jackson et Wolinsky, 1996). En
utilisant une ge´ne´ralisation des mode`les spatiaux de de´pendence limite´e, nous mon-
trons que l’estimateur est convergent et asymptotiquement normalement distribue´.
2Cooe´crit avec Ismael Mourifie´.
4Un des grands avantages de cet estimateur est sa simplicite´. L’estimation peut se
faire a` l’aide de commandes pre´programme´es pour la majorite´ des logiciels statis-
tiques. Nous pre´sentons une application en utilisant une base de donne´es fournie
par Yahoo ! contenant de l’information sur l’utilisation de leur service de messagerie
instantane´e pour plus de 22 millions d’utilisateurs. Nous trouvons que la probabi-
lite´ que deux individus interragissent par le service de messagerie instantane´e est
fonction de la densite´ locale du re´seau, du degre´ d’utilisation d’Internet par les
individus, ainsi que de la diffe´rence entre leurs caracte´ristiques socioe´conomiques
et le contenu des pages qu’ils ont visite´es.
Le troisie`me essai est intitule´ Do Peers Affect Student Achievement ? Evidence
from Canada Using Group Size Variation.3 Cet essai est diffe´rent des deux essais
pre´ce´dent puisqu’il utilise la forme du re´seau (ici un re´seau comple`tement connecte´)
afin d’estimer les effets de pairs, i.e. P(y|G,X). A` l’aide d’une base de donnne´e
fournie par le Ministe`re de l’e´ducation et des loisirs et des sports du Que´bec, et
de l’approche structurelle de Lee (2007), nous estimons l’effet de pair endoge`ne et
les effets de pairs exoge`nes, tout en controˆlant pour la pre´sence de chocs communs
pour quatre matie`res : Franc¸ais, Histoire, Sciences et Mathe´matiques. Les effets
endoge`nes sont positifs lorsqu’ils sont significatifs et de magnitude comparable avec
ceux trouve´s dans la lite´rature. Nous trouvons aussi quelques effets exoge`nes, dont
un effet ne´gatif de l’aˆge des pairs, qui est interpre´te´ comme un effet ne´gatif de la
pre´sence de doubleurs au sein d’un groupe.
3Cooe´crit avec Yann Bramoulle´, Habiba Djebbari et Bernard Fortin.
5CHAPITRE 2
STRUCTURAL HOMOPHILY
2.1 Introduction
The fact that similar individuals tend to interact with each other is a prominent
feature of social networks. The phenomenon, referred to as homophily, is increa-
singly being studied by economists.1 Indeed, the structure of the social networks
in which individuals interact has been shown to significantly influence many so-
cial outcomes such as segregation,2 information transmission and learning,3 and
employment and wages.4 Being able to understand, identify, and measure how
the social characteristics of an individual influence network formation is there-
fore of central importance. However, most studies to date overlook the equilibrium
implications of homophily, and disregard key factors such as the impact of time
constraints.
In this paper, I develop an empirically realistic model of strategic network for-
mation incorporating homophilic preferences and capacity constraints on the num-
ber of links. My analysis uncovers novel structural predictions generated by the
equilibrium interplay between the individuals’ homophilic preferences and capacity
constraints. Building on the explicit structure of homophily obtained in equili-
brium, I develop a new estimation technique that allows one to recover underlying
preferences parameters. I show as an illustration that the formation of friendship
networks among American teenagers is strongly influenced by racial considera-
tions. I also show that this preference bias toward individuals of the same race
varies considerably with respect to the racial group considered.
The emphasis on the equilibrium implications of homophilic preferences is new
1See for example Currarini et al. (2009), Bramoulle´ et al. (2012), and Rivas (2009).
2Echenique and Fryer (2007), Watts (2007), and Mele (2010).
3Golub and Jackson (2010a,2010b).
4van der Leij et al. (2009) and Patacchini and Zenou (2012).
6to the literature. The equilibrium network resulting from the theoretical model
exhibits more structure than the known stylized facts regarding homophilic patterns
in social networks.5 The equilibrium network architecture allows for an original
empirical methodology using a maximum likelihood approach. A key feature of the
estimation strategy is that it recovers explicit preference parameters characterizing
homophily in social networks. In other words, the estimation strategy allows for
the identification of preference interactions from constraint interactions.6
The theoretical framework produces sharp predictions. There exists a generi-
cally unique, empirically realistic equilibrium network. A key assumption is that the
homophilic preferences of individuals can be represented by a distance function on
the set of characteristics of the individuals. This idea is implicitly or explicitly ex-
ploited by many papers looking at homophily in social networks.7 This assumption
allows me to introduce enough heterogeneity in the model to generate empirically
realistic equilibrium networks. I also assume that individuals have link-separable
utilities, and an explicit resource constraint, such as time. For example, while a
teenager may prefer to be friends with other teenagers who have similar charac-
teristics, he must take into account the fact that he has limited time to spend
with the friends he chooses to have. Hence, the resource constraint explicitly intro-
duces an upper bound on the number of bilateral relationships an individual can
sustain.8 The specific notion of homophily emerging in equilibrium results from
the tension between the individuals’ homophilic preferences and the individuals’
resource constraint. These two premises imply a novel theoretical prediction on
the shape of homophily in equilibrium. I call this specific network architecture
structural homophily.
Structural homophily describes an explicit relationship between individuals’ so-
cioeconomic characteristics and the network architecture. An individual is charac-
5See Bramoulle´ et al. (2012), and Currarini et al (2009).
6Manski (2000) distinguishes between three sources of social interactions : Preference interac-
tions, Constraint interactions, and Expectations interactions.
7See for instance, Johnson and Gilles (2000), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006), Iijima and
Kamada (2010), Mele (2010) and Christakis et al. (2010).
8It relates to the sociological and psychological observation referred to as the Dunbar’s number.
7terized by a “social neighborhood” on the space of individual characteristics.9 This
neighborhood explicitly determines the set of acceptable bilateral relationships. In
a network characterized by structural homophily, two individuals are linked if and
only if they belong to the intersection of their neighborhoods. These neighborhoods
are not directly observable, but are implied by equilibrium predictions of the theo-
retical model for a given a distance function. This novel theoretical prediction has
empirical power.
I use structural homophily to develop an original estimation strategy. This stra-
tegy is based on the duality between the equilibrium network structure, and struc-
tural homophily. Any equilibrium network exhibits structural homophily, and any
observed network that exhibits structural homophily is an equilibrium network. I
develop a maximum likelihood approach, defined over a population of distinct social
networks. The empirical method allows for the identification and estimation of pro-
minent socioeconomic characteristics affecting the equilibrium network structure.
This is relevant for policy making since it allows the policy maker to target rele-
vant socioeconomic characteristics. As an illustration, I use data on the friendship
networks of American teenagers provided by the Add Health database.10 I focus
the analysis on race-based choices and show that the same-race preference bias
substantially varies with respect to racial group. Blacks have a stronger bias than
Asians, while Whites have the smallest bias. The estimated coefficients are prefe-
rence parameters, and hence do not depend on the distribution of the racial groups
in the population, nor do they depend on the individuals’ resource constraints.
This paper contributes to the theoretical and the empirical literature on net-
work formation. Most theoretical models of network formation produce relatively
structured equilibrium networks such as stars, circles or chains.11 These models,
although highly relevant from a theoretical perspective, are not well suited for em-
9It relates to the sociological notion of a “social niche” ; see for instance McPherson et al.
(2001)
10Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ; see
http ://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth.
11Bala and Goyal (2000), Jackson (2008, chapter 6), Jackson and Rogers (1997), Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), and Johnson and Gilles (2000).
8pirical purposes. Indeed, the resulting set of equilibrium networks is both too large
(many equilibrium networks) and too constraining (stars, chains, circles, etc.) to
represent actual, observable, social networks. Most theoretical models assume that
payoffs depend on detailed features of the network structure, but neglect the ca-
pacity constraints on the number of links an individual can make.12 I show that
the introduction of this constraint, combined with explicit ex-ante homophilic and
link-separable utilities, implies the existence of a unique, empirically realistic equi-
librium network.13
Two alternative explanations of homophily have been proposed. The first is
through correlations in the meeting process :14 individuals have no preference bias,
but individuals with similar characteristics have a higher probability of meeting.
The second is through preference biases :15 individuals prefer to link with similar
individuals. In this paper, I assume that individuals have homophilic preferences,
but evolve in a deterministic world. I analyze the equilibrium implication of these
preferences in a fully strategic, non-cooperative setting.
The empirical literature on network formation is still in an early stage. The
few existing papers clearly identify homophily as a driving factor of the network
formation process.16 This paper contributes to the literature on strategic network
formation by providing an estimation strategy based on the equilibrium structure of
homophilic preferences. Equilibrium considerations are important, as they imply a
departure from link-level estimation techniques. The model defines a precise depen-
dence structure which allows for the definition of an explicit maximum likelihood
estimator.17
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I present the
12Exceptions include Bloch and Dutta (2009) and Rub´ı-Barcelo´ (2010).
13I concentrate on strategic models of network formation. There exists a large literature on ran-
dom network formation, which is not directly concerned with the current setting. The interested
reader can see for instance Jackson (2008, chapters 4 and 5) and the references therein.
14See for instance Bramoulle´ et al. (2012)
15See Currarini et al. (2009), and Mele (2010)
16See for instance Christakis et al. (2010), Mele (2010), Currarini et al. (2010), and Franz et
al. (2008)
17As opposed to the simulated Bayesian approaches in Christakis et al. (2010), and Mele (2010).
9theoretical model and key definitions. In section 2.3, I find and characterize the
(unique) equilibrium network. In section 2.4, I describe the empirical methodology
and explore its properties using Monte Carlo simulations. In section 2.5, I present
an application of race-based homophily in friendship networks using the Add Health
database. I conclude in section 2.6.
2.2 The Theoretical Model
In this section, I present a non-cooperative model of network formation that
characterizes the equilibrium effects of homophily. The model generically produces
a unique equilibrium. I first provide a formal definition of Structural Homophily.
Next, I outline the theoretical framework, and finally, I briefly present the main
definitions and equilibrium concepts.
2.2.1 Structural Homophily
In order to introduce this new notion of homophily, we need some preliminary
assumptions. There is a finite set of individuals N . Individuals may be linked to-
gether through a network. Let gi ⊆ N be the set of individuals linked to individual
i for all i ∈ N . Each individual i ∈ N is characterized by a type θi ∈ Θ, where Θ
is the type space. An individual’s type could represent, for instance, a series of so-
cioeconomic characteristics. I consider a distance d on Θ. For notational simplicity,
let dij ≡ d(θi, θj) for any i, j ∈ N . Then, structural homophily is defined as follows.
Definition 1 A network g exhibits structural homophily with respect to a dis-
tance d(., .) if whenever two individuals, i and j, are not linked, either dij ≥
maxk∈gi{dik} or dij ≥ maxk∈gj{djk}.
This definition formalizes the fact that two individuals that are “close” should
be linked. Intuitively, if two individuals are not linked, it is because, from the point
of view of one of the individuals, the other is located relatively too far. Notice
that this definition only makes sense when the creation of a link requires mutual
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consent. Figure 2.1 shows two examples of networks for Θ = R2. The first network
exhibits Structural Homophily, but the second does not. In Figure 2.1b, the closest
individuals (i.e. D and E) are not linked, which is in contradiction with structural
homophily since D is linked to C, and E is linked to B.
Figure 2.1 – Structural Homophily
(a) Respected
A
B
C D
E
(b) Violated
A
B
C D
E
More insight can be obtained by drawing the equivalence (or indifference) curves
corresponding to the farthest link for each individuals considered (i.e. for B and
D in Figure 2.2a, and for D and E in Figure 2.2b). These equivalence curves
define neighborhoods ; every individual inside the neighborhood of i is at a distance
smaller the distance between i and his farthest link. If both individuals belong to
the intersection of the two neighborhoods generated by the equivalence curves (as
in Figure 2.2b), then Structural Homophily is violated.18
Structural homophily has an interpretation in terms of revealed preferences.
Suppose that individuals have preferences over links with other individuals, and
that such preferences are a function of the distance between the individuals. Sup-
pose also that we observe the network (i.e. the individuals and their links), and
the types of the individuals in the network (i.e. a series of individual characteris-
tics). Then, under mutual consent, we should not observe networks such as the one
depicted in Figure 2.2b. That is, structural homophily should hold.
18This closely relates to the cutoff rule of Iijima and Kamada (2010).
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Figure 2.2 – Structural Homophily : Equivalence curves
(a) Respected
A
B
C D
E
(b) Violated
A
B
C D
E
It it interesting to note that small-worlds networks respect structural homophily
for a specific type space.19 In a small world model, individuals are located on islands.
In that setting, structural homophily implies that individuals are linked first with
individuals of the same island. Hence, if there is a link between two islands, those
islands have to be fully connected. I now present a social networking game, which
produces Structural Homophily at equilibrium.
2.2.2 The Game
There are n individuals, each of whom is endowed with a fixed amount of
resources x¯i = κiξ, where ξ ∈ R+ and κi ∈ N. We will see that, in equilibrium, κi
is interpreted as the maximum number of links that an individual i can have. A
strategy for an individual i is a vector xi = (x
1
i , ..., x
n
i ) ∈ Xi, where Xi = {xi ∈
Rn+|xji ≤ ξ, and
∑
j∈N x
j
i ≤ κiξ}. Then, ξ plays the role of a link-level constraint.
The introduction of the link-level constraint is motivated by the empirical fact that
the number of links varies across individuals. Let X = ×i∈NXi. We say that there
is a link between an individual i and an individual j iff xji > 0 and x
i
j > 0. Let
gi = {j ∈ N |i and j are linked}, so j ∈ gi iff i ∈ gj. That is, a link exists iff
both individuals invest a strictly positive amount of resources in it. Notice that
individual i can be linked to himself.
19See for instance Jackson and Rogers (2005) and Galeotti et al. (2006).
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The utility of an individual is given by the function ui : X → R. It is additive
in the different links he has, and it is represented by :
ui(x) =
∑
j∈N\{i}
vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) · I{j∈gi} + wi(xii) · I{i∈gi}
where I{P} is an indicator function that takes value 1 if P is true, and 0 otherwise.
The function vi(x, y, d) gives the value of any link for i. It is assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable with vx(x, y, d) > 0 if y > 0, vy(x, y, d) > 0 if x > 0,
and vd(x, y, d) < 0 if x, y > 0. The function wi(x
i
i) represents the payoff received
from the private investment of i.20 It is also twice continuously differentiable with
w′(x) > 0. I also allow for the presence of fixed costs, i.e. vi(0, 0, d) ≤ 0 and
wi(0) ≤ 0. Notice that an individual benefits from a link only if both individuals
invest in the link. The model induces a game Γ between the n individuals. Formally,
we have Γ = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N).
The model has two important features. First, the initial endowment creates
scarcity and induces a feasibility constraint. This effect is typical of any matching
model. If some individual i invests resources in a link with individual j, he will
have less available resources to create a link with another individual. That is, the
feasibility constraint implies a tradeoff between the distance between two indivi-
duals, and the level of investment they put in the link. This is what Manski (2000)
refers to as “constraint interactions”. Second, the preferences are affected by the
presence of direct externalities. The amount of resources invested by some indivi-
dual in a given link directly affects the utility of the individuals he links to. That
is, in Manski’s terms, “preference interactions”. Those two features will play an
important role in equilibrium.
This completes the description of the game. I now present the main definitions.
20The function wi can also be interpreted as the private value of the resource x for i
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2.2.3 Definitions
Before turning to the analysis of the model, I introduce some definitions. The
collection of links between individuals generates a network g = (N,E). A network
is characterized by a set of individuals (here, N), and a set E of links, which are
(unordered) pairs of individuals. The set of all possible networks is denoted by G.
Any network g can be represented by a n×n adjacency matrix A that takes values
aij = 1 if j ∈ gi, and 0 otherwise, for all i, j ∈ N . The degree δi(g) of an individual
i is the number of links attached to i, i.e. δi(g) = |gi|.
I am interested in the following solution concepts :
Definition 2 A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a profile x∗ ∈ X such that ui(x∗i , x∗−i) ≥
ui(xi, x
∗
−i) for all xi ∈ Xi, and for all i ∈ N .
The set of Nash equilibria is very large. Since an individual benefits only from a
collaborative link when both individuals invest in the link, it will never be profitable
to unilaterally start a new link. For this reason, I will focus on the following solution
concept, introduced by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
Definition 3 A Bilateral Equilibrium (BE) is a profile x∗ ∈ X such that :
(1) x∗ is a Nash Equilibrium
(2) There exists no i, j ∈ N , such that ui(xi, xj, x∗−i−j) > ui(x∗) and uj(xi, xj, x∗−i−j) ≥
uj(x
∗) for some xi ∈ Xi and xj ∈ Xj.
This solution concept allows for bilateral deviations. This is a natural extension
of individual rationality, since individuals can benefit from the creation of links. For
certain economies, however, the BE concept will be too constraining. Accordingly,
I also introduce the following weakened equilibrium concept.
Definition 4 A Weak Bilateral Equilibrium (WBE) is a profile x∗ ∈ X such that :
(1) x∗ is a Nash Equilibrium
(2) There exists no i, j ∈ N , such that ui(xi, xj, x∗−i−j) > ui(x∗) and uj(xi, xj, x∗−i−j) >
uj(x
∗) for some xi ∈ Xi and xj ∈ Xj.
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In a WBE, a deviation must strictly increase the payoff of both individuals
involved. Notice that BE ⊆ WBE ⊆ NE. I discuss the distinction between these
concepts in section 2.3.1 (lemma 2.3.1 and proposition 2.3.5).
2.3 Equilibrium Characterization
I first show the existence of an equilibrium. Since the payoff functions are not
continuous, we cannot directly use the standard fixed-point arguments. The exis-
tence of a NE is straightforward. Let xji = 0 for all j 6= i. Then, for every individual,
the maximization problem becomes : maxxi∈Xi w(x
i
i) ·I{i∈gi}. The allocation x∗ ∈ X
that maximizes this problem for all i ∈ N is obviously a NE. In order to show the
existence of a WBE (or a BE), I will need to introduce additional assumptions.
The next result provides an intuition on the additional restrictions imposed by the
bilateral stability on the solution set. It states that if a deviation is jointly profi-
table, but not unilaterally profitable, the deviating individuals have to invest more
in their collaborative link. All proofs can be found in appendix I.1.
Lemma 2.3.1 If x∗ ∈ X is a NE, but not a WBE, given any deviating pair (i, j),
with profitable deviations xi ∈ Xi and xj ∈ Xj, we have xji > xj∗i and xij > xi∗j .
Since x∗ is a NE, it is individually rational. Also, since the utility functions are
additive in the different links, the action of individual j on individual i only affects
i through the link between i and j. If x∗ is not jointly rational for i and j, the
incentive to deviate must come from the link i and j have together.
Throughout this section, I consider two alternative assumptions :
Assumption 1 (Finiteness) For all i, j ∈ N , xji ∈ {0, ξ}
Assumption 2 (Convexity) For all i ∈ N , ∂2vi
∂x2
(x, y, d) ≥ 0, ∂2wi
∂x2
(x) ≥ 0
The finiteness assumption is extensively used in the literature.21 Convexity is
often assumed when the network formation process involves continuous strategies.
21See for instance Jackson (2008) chapters 6 and 11.
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For example, Bloch and Dutta (2009) define the strength of a link between in-
dividuals i and j as the sum of a (strictly) convex function of the individuals’
investment, i.e. sij = f(x
j
i ) + f(x
i
j), with f
′ > 0 and f ′′ > 0. Rubi-Barcelo´ (2010)
uses a linear (hence convex) function to represent the payoff from scientific colla-
boration between two researchers.22 I provide existence results and show that those
two assumptions imply that the equilibrium network exhibits structural homophily.
The next results are based on an algorithm referred to as the assignment al-
gorithm, and formally defined in Appendix I.2. The assignment algorithm uses as
inputs : (1) the list of preferences {ui(x)}i∈N , (2) the individual characteristics
{θi}i∈N , (3) the resource constraints {κi}i∈N , and (4) the distance function d on Θ.
It produces at least one allocation x ∈ X, and any allocation produced is such that
xji ∈ {0, ξ} for all i, j ∈ N . When xji ∈ {0, ξ}, the payoff that an individual receives
from the links can be ranked using the distance function (a small distance implies
a big payoff). Accordingly, the assignment algorithm proceeds first by linking the
pairs of individuals with the smallest distances (provided that the link is profitable
for both individuals, and leads to a higher payoff than the private investment). The
following results show that any allocation constructed in that fashion is a WBE,
and induces a network that exhibits structural homophily.
Let’s start with the finite case. Under Finiteness, the involvement of an in-
dividual in some link does not affect the amount of resources he invests in his
other (existing) links. The value of a link between two arbitrary individuals is then
independent of the other (potential) links. Consequently, we have the following :
Theorem 2.3.2 (Finite Strategy Space) Under Finiteness, an allocation is a
WBE iff it is produced by the assignment algorithm.
Under convexity, for a given link, it is also rational for both individuals to invest
resources until the link-level constraint ξ is met, provided that it leads to a positive
payoff. We then have the following :
22The value of a scientific collaboration as defined by Rubi-Barcelo´ (2008, p.7) is interpreted
as a distance in my model.
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Theorem 2.3.3 (Existence) Under Convexity, any allocation produced by the as-
signment algorithm is a WBE.
Proposition 2.3.4 gives sufficient conditions so that any individual has to invest
up to the link-level constraint, in any WBE.
Proposition 2.3.4 (Uniqueness) Suppose that the inequalities in Assumption 2
are strict, then any WBE can be produced by the assignment algorithm.
Then, under Finiteness or Strict Convexity, any equilibrium can be constructed
through the assignment algorithm. It is worth noting that under Finiteness, xji ∈
{0, ξ} by assumption, while under Strict Convexity it must hold only in equilibrium.
The above results show the existence of a WBE, but not of a BE. The intuition
is the following. Suppose that Finiteness holds, and that the economy contains only
3 individuals : i, j, k. Suppose also that dij = dik < djk, and that x¯i = x¯j = x¯k = ξ.
Finally, suppose that vi(ξ, ξ, dij) = vj(ξ, ξ, dij) = vk(ξ, ξ, dik) > 0, while any other
link has a negative value. Then, in this example, there is no BE, but there are two
WBE (see Figure 2.3). The reason is that i is indifferent between a link with j or
a link with k. So, if i is linked with j, but receives a proposition from k, he will
be indifferent between keeping his link with j and replacing it with a link with k
(while k would be strictly better off with such a deviation).
In many contexts, however, individuals have many characteristics, and the like-
lihood of such a circumstance is small. In the absence of such a circumstance, we
can show the existence of a BE. Formally,
Proposition 2.3.5 Suppose that dij 6= dkl for any i 6= j and k 6= l, then any
WBE produced by the assignment algorithm is a BE. Moreover, if d is such that
vi(ξ, ξ, dij) 6= 0 and vi(ξ, ξ, dij) 6= wi(ξ) for all i, j ∈ N , this equilibrium is unique.
This implies that if for all i ∈ N , the types θi ∈ Θ are drawn from a distribution
with a dense support on Θ, then there exists a unique WBE, which is also a BE,
[a.s.]
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Figure 2.3 – WBE and BE
(a) The First WBE (b) The Second WBE
Let’s now turn to the characterization of the equilibrium network. Since the
level of investment of an individual in a potential link does not depend on the
number of links he has, the payoffs are only influenced by the distance. Suppose
i and j are linked. Then, the creation of a new link between j and k has no
spillover effects on i. This produces important consequences on the shape of the
equilibrium network. The next proposition characterizes the allocations produced
by the assignment algorithm.
Proposition 2.3.6 (Characterization) Let g∗ be the network generated by some
allocation produced by the assignment algorithm, then
(1) For all i ∈ N , δi(g∗) ≤ κi.
(2) The network g∗ exhibits Structural Homophily.
The proof is immediate from the construction through the assignment algo-
rithm. Since investments are maximal in every link, the number of links an indi-
vidual can have is bounded by the resource constraint κi. Also, since the assign-
ment algorithm creates links starting from the ones associated with the smallest
distances, the induced network exhibits structural homophily. In essence, under Fi-
niteness or (strict) Convexity, any equilibrium network can be constructed through
the assignment algorithm, hence satisfying structural homophily.
Let’s now turn to efficiency issues. There are many ways to define efficiency. The
first one would be to consider the Pareto criterion. Given Finiteness or Convexity,
any BE is Pareto efficient. In fact, we have an even stronger result, which is the
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fact that any BE is a Strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959).
Proposition 2.3.7 Under Finiteness or Strict Convexity, any BE is a Strong
Nash equilibrium.
Since the utility functions are additive, bilateral stability implies stability in the
sense of a Strong Nash equilibrium. However, since the utility functions are non-
continuous (and utilities are not transferable), Pareto efficiency does not imply
efficiency in the sense of the utilitarian criterion. Consider the following social
welfare function :
W (x) =
∑
i∈N
ui(x)
In this case, efficiency is not guaranteed. In particular, one can find examples
of economies where the unique BE is efficient (in the sense of the utilitarian and
the Pareto criterion), as well as examples of economies where the unique BE is
inefficient (in the sense of the utilitarian criterion). This inefficiency comes from
two principle sources.
First, under the Finiteness assumption, any efficient allocation z ∈ X is such
that zji ∈ {0, ξ} for all i, j ∈ N (by assumption). Since an individual values only his
own payoff, while the social planner (SP) cares about all individuals, a collaborative
link is more valuable for the SP than it is for an individual. (It enters the utility
function of both the individuals involved.) The tradeoff between the individual and
the collaborative links is then different for an individual than for the SP.
Second, under the (strict) Convexity assumption, another issue arises. Since
the SP is willing to trade off the utilities of the individuals, an efficient allocation
z ∈ X need not be such that zji ∈ {0, ξ}. For example, suppose that there are no
fixed costs, then any network g∗ such that δi(g∗) < κi for some i ∈ N is inefficient.
The reason is that if δ∗i < κi for some i ∈ N , the creation of a link with some
agent j (who is willing to invest a small amount ) leads to vi(ξ, , dij) for i. If  is
small enough, the loss for j is compensated by the discrete jump in the utility of
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i. Hence, g∗ is inefficient. However, it is possible that such a network g∗ is induced
by a BE.
This concludes the analysis of the theoretical model. In section 4, I develop an
estimation technique derived from structural homophily, and present Monte Carlo
simulations.
2.4 The Econometric Model
In this section, I present the econometric model. I use Structural Homophily in
order to estimate the weights of the distance function.23 I would like to emphasize
that the method and results of this section are self-contained. If one was willing
to assume structural homophily (instead of viewing it as the equilibrium outcome
of the non-cooperative game presented in the last section), all the results of this
section would apply.
In order to present the econometric model, I introduce the following definition :
Definition 5 An observation q is
1) a network g = (Nq, Eq), and
2) for each individual i ∈ Nq, a vector of R individual socioeconomic characteristics,
i.e. {θi}i∈N , where θi is a 1×R vector.
For a given observation q ∈ 1, ..., Q, I note (gq, θq), where θq is nq×R. Definition
5 implies that an econometrician does not observe the specific level of investment
in a link (i.e the link-level constraint), nor does he observe the resource constraint
κi.
24 Accordingly, given a set of observations (gq, θq)
Q
q=1, we do not possess enough
information to construct the equilibrium network through the assignment algo-
rithm, even assuming some structural form for the utility functions. Specifically,
a standard econometric model would be the following. Given a parametric form
23Cˇopicˇ et al. (2009) also exploit homophily, although in a very different setting, in order to
develop their estimation technique.
24Notice that while κi is an upper bound to δi(g), they are not necessarily equals. See propo-
sition 2.3.6.
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for the payoff functions (i.e. {vi(x, y, d), wi(x)}i∈Nq), and the distance function (i.e.
d(i, j)), one would assume that the data is generated by :
gq = Λ(θq, κq, ξq, εq; β) (2.1)
where Λ is the assignment algorithm, κq is the nq × 1 vector of individual resource
constraints, ξq is the link-level resource constraint, εq is the error term, and β is
the vector of parameters to be estimated. Provided that one observes θq, κq, ξq,
one could, in principle, estimate β. Since κq and ξ are typically unobserved in
existing datasets, I use a different approach.25 From section 2.3’s results, I have
established that any allocation produced by the assignment algorithm respects
structural homophily.26 My approach will then be to maximize the likelihood that the
observed network exhibits structural homophily. Accordingly, the distance function
will play a central role. I assume the following structural form for the distance
function :
ln(dij) =
L∑
l=1
βlρl(θi, θj) + εij (2.2)
where ε ∼iid N(0, 1), and ρl(., .) is a dimension-wise distance function.27 The
vector (β1, ..., βL) ∈ Ξ ⊂ RL are the weights of the distance function. Equation
(2.2) highlights two important features of the model.
First, instead of trying to specifically identify the parameters of the utility
function, I limit myself to the estimation of the relative importance of the social
characteristics in the network formation process. That is, I only seek to estimate the
parameters of the distance function, and not the parameters of the utility functions
(for instance, I do not estimate the value of the resource for the individuals). This
25There are also severe computational and identification issues using the specification in (2.1).
26Also, by observing a network that exhibits structural homophily, one can always find some
vi(x, y, d), κi and ξ such that it is produced by the assignment algorithm.
27For instance, if Θ ∈ R2, one could choose ρl(θi, θj) = |θli − θlj |. The proposed structural form
is by no means the only possibility. Any positive and symmetric function could be used. I prefer
to use the specification in 2.2 to simplify the exposition.
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is illustrated in Figure 2.4. In Figure 2.4a, the individuals place more value on
the characteristic on the horizontal axis. Then, the “closest” individuals for the
central node are the ones on the top and bottom. Symmetrically, in Figure 2.4b,
the individuals place more value on the characteristic on the vertical axis. Then,
the “closest” individuals for the central node are the ones on the left and right. My
aim is to estimate the relative weights placed on each characteristics.28
Figure 2.4 – Changing the Weight of the Distance Function
(a) Relative Importance on
the Horizontal Characteris-
tic
(b) Relative Importance on
the Vertical Characteristic
Second, I assume that the distance function is observed with noise. That is, there
exists a set of variables, observed by the individuals within the model, but unob-
served by an econometrician, that affects the distance function.29 This assumption
is not standard and deserves a discussion.
A typical method to introduce unobserved heterogeneity into this type of models
would be to assume that the value of a link depends on some unobserved set of
characteristics, i.e. vi(x, y, d)+εij. However, this cannot be identified from a model
where the distance is observed with noise, since we can always define a symmetric
28Centered ellipses like those depicted in Figure 4 are implied by the additive form we assumed
in (2.2). The generalization to more general class of distance functions such as in Henry and
Mourifie (2011) is straightforward.
29For instance, εij can be interpreted as a measurement error.
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function d˜ : Θ2 → R such that vi(ξ, ξ, d˜ij) = vi(ξ, ξ, dij) + εij for all i 6= j.30
Now, given (2.2), we can compute the probability (conditional on an observa-
tion) that a network exhibits structural homophily. Let Ψ = 1−Φ, where Φ is the
c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, and let γ =
(
β1/
√
2, ..., βL/
√
2
)
. The
probability that a network g (given a set of characteristics θ) exhibit Structural
Homophily is (algebraic manipulations can be found in appendix I.3) :
P(sh|g, θ, γ) = Πij /∈g
{
Πk∈giΨ [(sik − sij)γ′] + Πk∈gjΨ [(sjk − sij)γ′]
−Πk∈giΨ [(sik − sij)γ′] Πk∈gjΨ [(sjk − sij)γ′]
}
(2.3)
where sij is the 1× L vector of dimension-wise distance, i.e. slij = ρl(θi, θj).31
Then, given that there are Q observations, I propose the following maximum
likelihood estimator :
`(β|θ) = 1
Q
Q∑
q=1
ln[P(sh|gq, θq, γ)] (2.4)
Provided that there exists a unique γ0 ∈ Ξ which maximizes (2.4), the maximum
likelihood estimator is well-behaved, and γ can be consistently estimated.32
The identification’s strategy is based on a link-deference approach. A link exists
if no individual refused it. There are two reasons for an individual to refuse a link :
(1) because he has no resources left (constraint interactions), or (2) because the
other individual is too distant (preference interactions). I want to identify the
preference effect, given that the resource constraint is unobserved. The estimation
strategy can be viewed as to minimize the probability that structural homophily is
violated.
30If vi is log quasi-linear in the distance, i.e. v(x, y, d) = f(x, y) − ln(d), the two models are
equivalent.
31Equation 2.3 assumes that there is no isolated individual (i.e. no individual i is such that
gi ∈ {∅, {i}}). This is done without loss of generality since for any pair of individuals in which one
of the individual is isolated, the condition imposed by structural homophily is trivially respected.
32Although the function in (2.3) looks peculiar, the MLE setting is standard and the estimation
of (2.4) requires only usual the usual set of assumptions. See for instance Cameron and Trivedi
(2005, p. 142-143) for the asymptotic properties of the maximum of likelihood estimator.
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Lets consider two alternative parameters β and β′. Suppose that we observe two
individuals, i and j, not linked together, as in Figure 2.5. According to β and β′, i
is linked to an individual, farther from him than j. This means that i would have
been willing to create a link with j, but that j refused. This implies that j cannot
be linked to individuals farther from him than i. If he does, structural homophily
is violated. Thus, if j is linked to farther individuals than i under β, but not under
β′, then β′ is chosen over β to represent individuals’ preferences.
Figure 2.5 – Admissible Parameters, Θ = R2
(a) Distance Weights according to β
i
j
(b) Distance Weights according to β′
i
j
This shows why isolated individuals (i.e. individuals that have no link) provide
no information : whatever the parameters’ values, they never contradict structural
homophily. In other words, for isolated individuals, we cannot identify whether
they are isolated because they have limited resources, or because they have strong
homophilic preferences. From a revealed preference approach, we gain information
about an individual’ preferences by observing his choices. If an individual is not
connected, he does not ”consume” any resource. We therefore cannot say anything
about his preferences.
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I now explore the properties of this method through Monte Carlo simulations.
2.4.1 Monte Carlo Simulations
I now present some Monte Carlo simulations. One of the advantage of section
2.3 is that it provides a simple algorithm allowing for the construction of the equi-
librium network. Using the assignment algorithm, I will explore the finite sample
properties of the estimator defined in the previous section. For simplicity and be-
cause of computational limitations, I assume that Θ = R2 (this could represent, for
example, the geographic position of the individuals), and ρl(θi, θj) = |θli − θlj|. For
all i ∈ N , I assume that θi ∼iid N(0, σ2I). Thus, σ2 controls for the dispersion of
the individuals on the plane. As assumed, I let εij ∼ N(0, 1). I run 1000 replications
of an economy composed of 150 independent populations (networks), each of which
has 20 individuals, and I vary κi and σ
2 (I assume that κi is drawn from a uniform
distribution).
The simulated networks are generated using the assignment algorithm, assu-
ming that vi(ξ, ξ, dij) > 0 for all i, j ∈ N and that wi(ξ) < 0 for all i ∈ N . I assume
that the weights are β = (2, 6), so the distance is d(θi, θi) = 2|θ1i − θ1j |+ 6|θ2i − θ2j |.
Figure 2.6 displays a typical equilibrium network for this economy. Figure 2.6a
shows the simulated network on the plane while Figure 2.6b rearranges the indi-
viduals in order to see clearly the network structure. Notice that the individuals
value the vertical characteristic more than the horizontal one.
The small size of each observation (i.e. 20 individuals in every network) has an
impact on the precision of the estimator. Take the following limiting case. Suppose
that, as in the simulation framework, every link is profitable. Then, if the resource
constraint is large enough, the equilibrium network is the complete network, and
Structural Homophily is not binding. As a result, the model in (2.4) is not identified.
I now explore the precision of the estimator when individuals have a relatively large
resource constraint, compared to the size of the population. I find that the estimator
performs better when the maximal number of links is small compared to the size
33Using the Kamada-Kawai algorithm is a standard way of drawing networks on the plane.
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Figure 2.6 – Typical network, with β = [2 6], and κi ∼ U [1, 4]
(a) In the type space
�1
�2
(b) K.K. representation33
of the population, and that the precision of the estimator can be improved by
increasing the dispersion of the population on the type space.
Table 2.1 and Figure I.1 to I,4 (Appendix I.4) show the simulation results.
Since the parameters are only scale-identified, I report only the relative estimates.
Simulations show that as the number of links increases (relative to the size of the
population), the precision of the estimator is increased, but the estimates can be
slightly biased upward. However, this problem vanishes as the distribution of the
population over the type space increases.
I now turn to the implementation of the estimation technique. In the next
section, I use the Add Health database to address the role of race in the formation
of friendship networks.
2.5 Empirical Application : High-School Friendship Networks
I wish to estimate the weights of the distance function that leads to the for-
mation of the friendship networks of American teenagers. I am particularly inter-
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Tableau 2.I – Monte Carlo Simulations
Standard Deviation (σ)
κi 10 12 14 16
{1, 2} 3.031 3.024 3.02 3.01
( 0.026 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
{3, 4} 3.077 3.045 3.03 3.02
( 0.027 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 )
{5, 6} 3.089 3.050 3.03 3.03
( 0.029 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
{7, 8} 3.104 3.069 3.05 3.03
( 0.032 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
{9, 10} 3.107 3.081 3.05 3.04
( 0.033 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
{11, 12} 3.112 3.082 3.05 3.04
( 0.034 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
{13, 14} 3.117 3.082 3.05 3.04
( 0.044 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 )
{15, 16} 3.122 3.090 3.06 3.05
( 0.047 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.06 )
ested in the role of race, as previous studies have suggested there is a significant
race-based preference bias in the choice of friendship relations among teenagers.
Currarini et al. (2010) use a search model in order to estimate the preference bias
for Asians, Blacks, Hispanics and Whites. They show that Asians have the lar-
gest preference bias, followed by Whites, Hispanics and Blacks. Using a different
approach, Mele (2011) estimates the role that homophilic preferences toward race
plays in the formation of friendship networks. He shows that all racial groups have
strong homophilic preferences, although he does not capture any strong differences
between groups. Interestingly, I find strong evidence that the racial preference bias
varies across racial groups, although I find that Blacks have the strongest bias,
followed by Asians and Whites.
As in the two papers mentioned, I use the Add Health database as it is particu-
larly well suited for my model. Recall that the model presented in sections 2.2 and
2.3 assumes that the individuals of the same population meet with probability one.
A convincing empirical implementation then requires that the observed populations
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are small enough. To that effect, the Add Health database provides information
on students’ high-schools, which are quite small entities.34 Specifically, the sample
includes the race, and the friendship networks of 5,466 teenagers, coming from 98
high schools in the U.S. The variable of interest is race. I assume that a student’s
type is his or her race. Thus the type space has 4 dimensions : White, Black, Asian,
Native. Formally, Θ = {0, 1}4, so a student who considers himself as Black-Asian
would be of type θ = (0, 1, 1, 0). I assume the following distance function :
ln d(xi, xj) =
4∑
r=1
βrI{xri 6=xrj} + εij (2.5)
where I{P} is an indicator function that takes value 1 if P is true, and 0 other-
wise. For instance, the distance between a teenager i who is White, and a teenager
j who is Black, is d(xi, xj) = βwhite + βblack. The β’s measure the relative strength
of the preference bias toward individuals of a particular racial group, e.g. being
Black, v.s. being non-Black.
The Add Health questionnaire asks each teenager to identify their best friends
(up to 10, and a maximum 5 males and 5 females). I assume that two individuals
are friends only if they attend the same school. This assumption is standard in
the literature using Add Health data. This allows each school (the set of teenagers
and the network) to be treated as an observation. Thus, the database contains 98
observations (i.e. 98 schools). Table 2.II summarizes the data :
Tableau 2.II – Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
White 0.733 0.442
Black 0.150 0.357
Asian/Pacific 0.031 0.174
Native 0.062 0.242
Degree 2.064 1.284
34For that reason, and for computational reasons, I limit myself to schools for which I observe
less than 300 students, which is about 68% of the schools in the database. I also remove the
isolated individuals, as they provide no relevant information (see p.18, last paragraph).
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I estimate the model (2.4), using the distance function in (2.5). The estimated
weights (βˆ1, ..., βˆ4) and the corresponding standard errors are shown in Table 2.III.
Since the weights are only scale-identified, I report the relative effects. The estima-
tion shows that the weight associated with the Blacks’ dimension is the greatest
(2.270 times greater than the Whites’, and 1.796 times greater than the Asians’).
The Asians’ dimension is the second in magnitude (1.264 times greater than the
Whites’). I find no statistically significant relative weight for the Natives’ dimen-
sion. Notice that this is independent of the relative proportion of each racial group
in the population, and the (unobserved) individuals’ time constraints.
Tableau 2.III – Relative Estimated Weights (White normalized to 1)†
Black Asian Native
Estimate†† 2.270** 1.264** -0.199
SE (0.244) (0.157) (0,150)
Robust SE††† [0.304] [0.294] [0.171]
† S.E computed using the delta method.
†† ∗∗ for 1% significance level.
††† Robust SE using the (sandwich) variance-covariance matrix for pseudo-m.l.e.
Turning back to the distance functions, one can reconstruct the distance bet-
ween the different racial groups from the estimates in Table 2.III. Recall that, for
instance, the distance between a Black and a White is d(black, white) = βblack +
βwhite. Then, according to Table 2.III, the distance between Blacks and Asians
is the greatest (d = 3.534), followed by the distance between Blacks and Whites
(d = 3.270) and the one between Whites and Asians (d = 2.264). This shows that,
in order to correctly specify the impact of homophilic preferences on the crea-
tion of links, one has to take in to account the impact of the preference biases of
both individuals involved. Structural homophily allows to identify those preference
biases.
I now discuss the limitations of my approach and suggest some potential gene-
ralizations.
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2.6 Going Further
I have shown that structural homophily can be obtained by a non-cooperative
game of network formation. Under Finiteness or (strict) Convexity, any Bilateral
Equilibrium of the game features structural homophily. I also have shown that
structural homophily has empirical implications. I develop an estimation technique
that can be used to estimate some parameters of the model, namely the weights of
the distance function. I can then identify which social characteristics significantly
influence the network formation process. Being able to estimate the magnitude
of these relevant characteristics is an important step in the process of designing
efficient policies, as it allows the policy makers to target relevant characteristics.
To illustrate this method, I estimated the weights of the distance function in the
context of friendship networks for teenagers. I found significant differences in the
homophilic preference bias between racial groups.
The model developed in this paper is a first step toward a better understan-
ding of network formation processes under time constraints. However, there are
still many unanswered questions. For instance, the results in section 3 are based on
the Finiteness or Convexity assumption. Those are arguably strong assumptions as
they imply that individuals invest as much as they can in their existing links. This
may not be true in general. However, the study of the model under a concavity
assumption faces difficult existence issues. One could address this issue by consi-
dering weaker solution concepts such as Pairwise Stability (Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996) which potentially exhibit less structured equilibrium networks.
Another potential extension would be to introduce probabilities of meeting bet-
ween individuals. Without meeting probabilities, the set of potential friends is the
same for every individuals, i.e. the whole population. In general, in large popula-
tion, some individuals may not know themselves, which would obviously prevent
them from creating a link. A simple way to introduce meeting probabilities would
be to assume that the set of potential friends is limited to individuals that have
“met”. Hence, individuals can only invest resources in links with individuals in a
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subset of the population. In that case, the (ex-post) strategy space would not be
the same for every individual, but structural homophily would still hold in equili-
brium (provided that the set of potential friends is known). More elaborate models
could however assume that meeting friends is a costly process. The individuals
would then be allowed to endogenously choose the amount of resource they spend
searching for friends.35 As the estimation technique does not require the observa-
tion of the time constraints, structural homophily is likely to hold in equilibrium.
However, in both extensions, the estimated parameters may not be interpreted in
terms of preferences. If homophily affects the preferences and the random meeting
process, it is unclear how those two effects can be identified.
35A nice example of a search model with homophilic preferences is Currarini et al. (2009).
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CHAPITRE 3
MY FRIEND FAR FAR AWAY : ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES OF
PAIRWISE STABLE NETWORKS1
3.1 Introduction
How do social networks form ? Specifically, how can we measure the influence
of an individual’s socioeconomic characteristics on the identity of his peers ? We
know that many social networks exhibit strong racial or religious segregation (see
for instance Echenique and Fryer 2007, Watts 2006, and Mele 2007). This observa-
tion raises many interesting questions regarding the cause of this segregation. For
instance, we would like to be able to distinguish the impact of the individuals’ cha-
racteristics (e.g. race), and the impact of the individuals’ positions in the networks
(e.g. popularity). The shape of the existing social networks also have measurable
effects on individuals’ choices. Many studies show a strong influence of an indi-
vidual’s peers on his actions, ranging from unhealthy consumption choices (e.g.
Fortin and Yazbeck 2011 and the references therein) to labor force participation
(e.g. van der Leij et al. 2009, and Patacchini and Zenou 2012). However, since
most social networks are endogenously formed, the estimated influence of peers is
likely to be biased.2 Understanding how the networks are formed could then allow
us to control for this endogeneity and suggest policy instruments that would help
influence network formation processes.
In this paper, we provide a simple Maximum Likelihood estimator which al-
lows us to recover underlying preference parameters for pairwise stable networks
(Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). The approach is compelling as it only requires the
observation of a single network. We show that the estimator is consistent and
asymptotically normally distributed provided that individuals’ preferences exhibit
1This chapter is a joint work with Ismael Mourifie´.
2The literature on peer effects have only recently considered explicitly the endogeneity of social
networks. See for instance Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2011), and Blume et al. (2011).
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a weak version of homophily. Homophily is one of the most robust empirical fact
about social networks. It formalizes the observation that similar individuals are
more likely to interact with each other. As homophily is featured by both theoreti-
cal (e.g. Bramoulle´ et al. 2012, and Currarini et al. 2009), and empirical (e.g. Mele
2007, and Christakis et al. 2010) models of network formation, our methodology
is applicable to many existing models of network formation. We apply this new
methodology to the formation of communication networks, using a database on
the Yahoo !’s Instant Messaging service. We find that the probability that a link is
created is strongly influenced by the local density of the network, by their general
Internet usage, and by their socio-economic and Internet behavior differences.
A fundamental challenge in estimating a network formation process is the highly
dependent nature of most socio-economic relationships. Consider for instance the
case of friendship networks. The probability that Adam and Beth are friends de-
pends on their individual characteristics. However, it may also depends on the fact
that Beth is friend with Charlotte (who maybe does not like Adam). The proba-
bility that Adam and Beth are friends may then depend on Charlotte’s individual
characteristics. Hence, the observation “Adam and Beth are friends” depends on
Charlotte’s characteristics. However, if individuals have homophilic preferences, the
probability that Adam and Beth are friends should be primarily influenced by indi-
viduals similar to them. If Adam and Beth are high-school teenagers for instance,
the probability that they become friends increases if they go the the same school,
or if they attend the same classes. Accordingly, if Beth and Charlotte are friends,
there is a greater probability that they go to the same school, or at least that they
live in the same country. Then, Donald, a elderly man, living in a different coun-
try (hence having individual characteristics quite different from those of Adam,
Beth and Charlotte) probably does not influence much the probability that Adam
and Beth become friends. We generalize this argument and show that homophily
implies a generalization of the φ-mixing property used in time-series and spatial
econometric models. This fact allows us to define a consistent estimation strategy
based on a Quasi Maximum Likelihood estimator.
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This paper contributes to the empirical literature on strategic network forma-
tion. Two main approaches have been proposed. The first approach is specifically
interested in estimating homophilic preferences (see for instance Boucher 2012,
and Currarini et al. 2010) and uses standard frequentist approaches, i.e. standard
Maximum Likelihood estimators. As these papers assume ex-ante homophily, they
are limited in their scope of applications. Also, the maximum likelihood methods
proposed require the observation of many (mostly independent) social networks,
which is not always available in existing databases.
The second approach requires the observation of only one network, at one point
in time. As the observations are highly dependent, standard maximum likelihood
methods are not consistent. Accordingly, most papers use a Bayesian approach, and
as the likelihood function cannot usually be written explicitly, most papers rely on
simulation methods such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (in particular Christakis
et al. 2010, Mele 2010, and Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens 2011). If they put
less restrictions on the individuals’ preferences, those methods are however quite
complex to implement in practice, and the computing time needed makes them
unsuitable for large database.
We contribute to this literature by providing a explicit Quasi Maximum Like-
lihood Estimator (QMLE) when we observe only one social network, at one point
in time. We introduce a weakened notion of homophily, and show that it implies
that our QMLE is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. In order to
do so, we use Large Laws of Numbers and Central Limit Theorems due to Jenish
and Prucha (2009), as well as estimators for the variance-covariance matrices due
to Conley (1999) and Bester et al. (2011).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2.1, we present
the economy. In section 3.2.2, we propose an estimator of the equilibrium social
network which allows to recover the underlying individuals’ preferences. In section
3.3, we derive the asymptotic distribution of our estimator, and in section 3.4, we
define a class of network formation models suited to our econometric framework. In
section 3.5, we provide an application using the formation of online communication
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network, and we discuss policy-making implications and potential avenues for future
research in section 3.6.
3.2 The basic framework
3.2.1 The Economy
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of individuals. Each individual is characterized by
a random vector of T ≥ 1 characteristics xi = (x1i , ..., xTi ) ∈ X . We assume that
X ⊂ RT and we define the distance between two individuals as d(i, j) = d(xi, xj),
where d is a distance on RT . Finally, we note x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ X n the matrix
of individual characteristics. Is it worth noting that the choice of the distance
function d is arbitrary. In general, the choice of this distance function will be
context-dependent. In particular, the distance can represent spatial preferences of
the individuals.3 We provide an example in section 3.5.
Let m = n(n−1)
2
be the number of possible pairs of individuals (i, j) for i 6= j
in the economy. We assume that individuals interact in a network gm = (N,W),
where W is a n×n symmetric matrix that takes values wij = 1 if i ∈ N and j ∈ N
are linked by a socio-economic relationship (e.g. friendship), and wij = 0 otherwise.
For a given set of individuals N , the set of all possible networks is noted Gm. For
a given network gm ∈ Gm, we will note ij ∈ gm if wij = 1. We will also denote by
g− ij, the network gm from which we removed the link between i and j. If ij /∈ gm,
then gm − ij = gm. We define gm + ij similarly.
The set of links an individual has is noted Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : ij ∈ gm}. The
cardinality of that set is the degree of an individual, formally ni(gm) = |Ni(gm)|.
The geodesic distance (or shortest path) between i and j in the network gm equals
the minimal number of existing links in gm such that j can be reached from i.
Let ρij(gm) be the geodesic distance between i and j in the network gm. We say
that i and j are connected in gm if ρij(gm) < ∞. If i and j are not connected, we
let ρij(gm) = ∞. Let Rgmij = {k ∈ N |min(ρik(gm), ρjk(gm)) < ∞} be the set of
3See in particular Henry and Mourifie´ (2011) for spatial preferences on the euclidean space.
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individuals connected either to i or to j. For V ⊂ N , we note gm|V the network
restricted to individuals in V , i.e. for all i, j ∈ V , we have (w|V )ij = wij, while we
have (w|V )ij = 0 if i ∈ N \ V or j ∈ N \ V . Let also xV ∈ X |V | be the matrix of
individual characteristics of individuals in V .
We assume that the network gm = (N,W) is endogenous and determined as
a function of the individuals’ (stochastic) utilities. An individual has preferences
over the set of characteristics and the network structure in the economy, i.e. ui :
Gm × X n → R. Specifically, we write ui(gm, x; θ, εi) where θ ∈ (θ1, ..., θK) ∈ Θ
is the set of parameters to be estimated, and the vector εi = (εi1, ..., εin) is the
unobserved component of the utility function. It will be convenient to use the
following representation of the utility function.
Definition 6 Given gm and x, the value for i ∈ N of a link with j ∈ N \ {i} is
given by
Hji (gm, x; θ, εi) = ui(gm, x; θ, εi)− ui(gm − ij, x; θ, εi)
Given Hji (gm, x; θ, εi) for all i, j ∈ N , we want to know what information can be
retrieved from the observation of a single network gm ∈ Gm, and a set of individual
characteristics x ∈ X n. We concentrate on the properties of the network gm and
not on the specific dynamic process by which the network is created. For instance,
we do not require the links to be added in a specific order to the network. We rather
assume that the observed network gm is stable. We are interested in a particular
notion of stability, introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Definition 7 A network gm is Pairwise Stable if, for all i, j ∈ N , the two
following conditions hold simultaneously :
1) if wij = 1 then [ H
j
i (gm, x; θ, εi) ≥ 0 and H ij(gm, x; θ, εj) ≥ 0 ]
2) if wij = 0 then [ H
j
i (gm + ij, x; θ, εi) > 0 implies H
i
j(gm + ij, x; θ, εj) < 0 ]
Then, a link is created iff it is profitable for both individuals involved.4 Let
PSN ⊆ Gm be the set of pairwise stable networks. The existence and multiplicity
4Notice that conditions 1 and 2 of definition 7 are mutually exclusives as wij ∈ {0, 1}.
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of equilibria are discussed in section 3.4.3. For now, assume that there exists a
unique pairwise stable network. Pairwise stability is extensively used in the lite-
rature on strategic network formation.5 Any potential deviation from a pairwise
stable network results from a single pair of individuals changing the status of its
link. That is, any admissible deviation is such that gm ∈ Gm goes from gm to gm+ij
for some i, j ∈ N , or from gm to gm − ij for some i, j ∈ N . Pairwise stability can
then be viewed as the weakest bilateral extension from the set of individually ra-
tional networks.6 We study the asymptotic properties of pairwise stable networks.
In the next section, we present the econometric framework.
3.2.2 The Econometric Framework
We want to know what information can be retrieved from the observation of a
single pairwise stable network. Specifically, suppose that we observe a set of m pairs
of individuals. The set of pairs is noted Sm, with typical elements s and r. Any two
individuals i and j necessarily belong to some pair s, where s = (s1, s2) = (i, j). For
each pair, we observe the status (linked or not) of the pair and the socio-economic
characteristics of the individuals in the pair (age, gender, income...). We formally
define the position of a pair s ∈ Sm in X as the average point between s1 and s2,
i.e. xs ∈ X such that xs = xs1+xs22 .7 Accordingly, the distance between two pairs r
and s is equal to d(s, r) = d(xr, xs) = d(
s1+s2
2
, r1+r2
2
).
In this section, we show that pairwise stability allows to express the probability
of a link’s status in terms of the observable socio-economic characteristics. We
present our first assumption.
Assumption 3 (Preferences) For all i, j ∈ N ,
(3.1) Hji (gm, x; θ, εi) = h
j
i (gm, x; θ) + εij, with εij|gm, x ∼ N(0, 1).
5See for instance Jackson (2008, chapter 6).
6For comparisons between stability concepts on networks, see for instance Bloch and Jackson
(2006) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007).
7This is done without loss of generality. The method is robust to other definitions of a pair’s
position in X , as long as xs is located in a given neighbourhood of xs1 and xs2 .
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(3.2) hji (gm, x; θ) is three times continuously differentiable in θ.
(3.3) Θ is a compact subset of RK, for K ≥ 1.
Assumption 3.2 and 3.3 are standard technical requirements. Assumption 3.1
deserves more attention. The error term εij is interpreted as a random shock on the
value of the pair, hence εij = εji. The separability of the error term is quite standard
(see Additive Random Utility Models, following McFadden, 1981). Also, as our
endogenous variable (i.e. the status of a pair) is discrete, only scale-identification
can be achieved. There is then no loss of generality in normalizing the variance of
the error term. We assume that εij follows a normal distribution for convenience
(for instance, it allows to present our estimator as a standard Probit, see below).
In general, our method can be adapted to many distributional assumptions. In
particular, all our results are valid for any distribution for which the left-tail of the
cdf distribution is exponentially bounded. Notice that while the εij are identically
distributed, they are not necessarily independent.
We want to estimate θ ∈ Θ, given the fact that the observed network gm is
pairwise stable. Given definition 2, a link ij is created (i.e. wij = 1) if and only
if Hji (gm, x; θ, εi) ≥ 0 and H ij(gm, x; θ, εj) ≥ 0. Then, under assumption 3.1, the
probability that wij = 1 for i, j ∈ N is equal to Φ(min{hji (gm, x; θ), hij(gm, x; θ)}),
where Φ is the c.d.f. for the standardized normal distribution. We then propose the
following QMLE.
Lm(θ) = 1
m
∑
ij:i<j
wij ln[Φ(min{hji (gm, x; θ), hij(gm, x; θ)})]
+ (1− wij) ln[1− Φ(min{hji (gm + ij, x; θ), hij(gm + ij, x; θ)})] (3.1)
This is actually a standard probit model.8 However, the estimator
θˆ = argmaxθ∈ΘLm(θ) is not necessarily consistent (as m→∞) since the observa-
tions can be dependent. For instance, hji (gm, x; θ) may depends on the number of
8Notice that P (wij = 0)+P (wij = 1) = 1 since the two conditions in definition 7 are mutually
exclusives.
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links i and j have in the network gm. In the next section, we find sufficient condi-
tions for the consistency and asymptotic normality of θˆ = argmaxθ∈ΘLm(θ) when
the number of pairs m goes to infinity.
3.3 Limited Dependence Theorems
In this section, we present two theorems for dependent observations. We show
that under φ-mixing, θ ∈ Θ can be consistently estimated using the model in
(3.1). Those theorems are useful since, as we show in section 4, there exist simple
conditions on hji which imply φ-mixing.
9
We start by introducing the following random variable, for all pairs s ∈ Sm :
Zs,m =
1 if H
s2
s1
(gm, x; θ, εs1) ≥ 0 and Hs1s2 (gm, x; θ, εs2) ≥ 0
0 otherwise
The random field {Zs,m; s ∈ Sm,m ∈ N} is defined on the probability space
(Ω,F ,P), where Ω = {0, 1}m, F is a σ-algebra on Ω, and P is a probability measure
on Ω. To clarify the exposition, we use the following simplifying notation :
qs,m(zs,m|x, gm, θ) = ws ln[Φ(min{hs2s1(gm, x; θ), hs1s2(gm, x; θ)})]
+ (1− ws) ln[1− Φ(min{hs2s1(gm + s, x; θ), hs1s2(gm + s, x; θ)})]
so (3.1) can be written as :
Lm(θ) = 1
m
∑
s∈Sm
qs,m(zs,m|x, gm, θ) (3.2)
We also use qs,m(θ) = qs,m(zs,m|x, gm, θ) when there is no ambiguity.
We now turn to the dependence structure of (3.2). For any two events A ∈ A
and B ∈ B, where A,B are sub-σ-algebras of F , the φ-mixing coefficient is given
9Our results can easily be adapted to other mixing definitions such as α-mixing.
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by
φ(A,B) = sup{|P(A|B)− P(A)|, A ∈ A, B ∈ B,P(B) > 0}
This is analog to standard time-series models. In a time dependent model,
the estimation is consistent if limr→∞ supt φ(F t−∞,F∞t+r) = 0, where F t2t1 is the σ-
algebra for the realizations from time t1 to time t2.
10 We want to apply the same
basic approach when the dependence between A and B goes through X . Then,
instead of characterizing an observation by its position in time, we define it by its
position in X . Since the dependence in X is more complex than time-dependence,
the asymptotic convergence of the φ-mixing coefficient is not sufficient. In order
to show the consistency and asymptotic normality of θˆ = argmaxθLm(θ), we use
Large Laws of Numbers and Central Limit theorems for dependent observations on
random fields developped by Jenish and Prucha (2009, Theorems 1,2 and 3). Lets
introduce the following definition.
Definition 8 Let A,B ⊂ Ω, with corresponding σ-algebra Am and Bm. Let also
|A| and |B| denote the number of pairs of individuals in A and B. We define the
following function :
φ¯k,l(r) = sup
m
sup
A,B
(φ(Am,Bm), |A| ≤ k, |B| ≤ l, d(A,B) ≥ r)
where d(A,B) is the Hausdorff distance on X for the set of pairs in A and B.
We will show that a sufficient condition for the consistency and the asymptotic
normality of θˆ = argmaxθLm(θ) is the following :
Assumption 4 (φ-mixing)
(4.1)
∑∞
r=1 r
T−1φ¯1/21,1 (r) <∞
(4.2)
∑∞
r=1 r
T−1φ¯k,l(r) <∞, for k + l ≤ 4
(4.3) φ¯1,∞(r) = O(r−T−) for some  > 0.
Recall that T ≥ 1 is the dimension of X . In words, not only φ¯k,l(r) has to
converge to 0, but this convergence has to be fast enough. In section 4, we give
10See for instance White (2001).
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sufficient conditions under which assumption 4 holds. For the moment, we show
the validity of the estimation technique given that φ-mixing is respected. The first
theorem concerns the consistency of θˆ = argmaxθ∈Θ Lm(θ). First, we need some
regularity conditions.
Assumption 5 (Regularity I)
(5.1) There exists a unique θ0 ∈ int Θ maximizing limm→∞ E[Lm(θ)].
(5.2) For all s1, s2 ∈ N , d(s1, s2) ≥ d0 for some d0 > 0.
(5.3) supm sups E[supθ∈Θ |qs,m(θ)|(1+η)] <∞ for some η > 0.
(5.4) supm sups E[supθ∈Θ |∂qm,s(θ)∂θ |] <∞.
Assumption 5.1 is the identification condition. Assumption 5.2 is the increasing
domain assumption. It ensures that the distance goes to infinity as the number
of individuals goes to infinity. Given the existence of a minimal distance d0, the
sub-space of X which contains all the individuals has to expand (with respect to d)
as the number of individuals increases. This assumption describes how the space
of individual characteristics X is filled as the number of pairs m goes to infinity.
Finally, assumption 5.3 and 5.4 require standard moment conditions on the payoff
function. We have the following.
Theorem 3.3.1 (Consistency) Suppose that assumptions 3 and 5 hold, and that
assumption (4.2) is respected for k = l = 1. Then, the estimator θˆ = argmaxθ∈Θ Lm(θ)
is consistent as m→∞.
We still need to derive the asymptotic distribution of θˆ. We define the following
matrices :
D0(θ0) = limm→∞E[
∂2Lm(θ0)
∂θ∂θ′
]
B0(θ0) = limm→∞mE[
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
(
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
)′
]
Now, since the asymptotic normality of the estimator requires more structure
than the one needed for consistency, we need assumptions 4.1-4.3, as well as the
following additional regularity conditions.
41
Assumption 6 (Regularity II)
(6.1) B0(θ0) > 0.
(6.2) D0(θ0) is invertible.
(6.3) supm sups E[supθ∈Θ ‖Dm,s(θ)‖1+η] <∞ for some η > 0.
(6.4) supm sups E[supθ∈Θ ‖∂Dm,s(θ)∂θ ‖] <∞.
(6.5) supm sups E[supθ∈Θ |∂qs,m(θ)∂θ |2] <∞
where Dm,s(θ) =
∂2qs,m(θ)
∂θ∂θ′ . Those assumptions are quite standard and are sufficient
to show the asymptotic normality of our estimator.11
Theorem 3.3.2 (Asymptotic Normality) Let m → ∞. Under assumptions
3, 4, 5 and 6, the estimator θˆ = argmaxθ∈Θ Lm(θ) is normally distributed with
variance-covariance matrix given by D−10 B0D
−1
0 /m.
The Variance-Covariance Matrix is the equivalent for our setting of the Hete-
roskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) variance-covariance matrix.
The estimation of those variances is not straightforward. The estimation of D0(θ0)
follows from theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 since D0(θ) has the same dependence struc-
ture as limm→∞ ELm(θ). A consistent estimator is then Dm(θˆ) = 1m
∑m
s=1Ds,m(θˆ).
Defining a consistent estimator for B0(θ0) is more challenging. We suggest two ap-
proaches to estimate B0(θ0). The first one is based on a generalization of standard
HAC estimators and is due to Conley (1999). The estimator Bm(θ) is formally des-
cribed in the appendix II. Under mixing conditions, Bm(θ) is a consistent estimator
for B0(θ0). Although valid, this estimator can be very computationally intensive
when the number of dimensions of X increases (say, T ≥ 4). An alternative ap-
proach have been suggest by Bester et al. (2011), where they propose to use the well
known Variance Cluster (VC) estimator (also formally described in appendix II).
Although the estimator is not consistent under weak dependence, they show that
the estimator converges to a well defined random variable and that the standard
t-test are still valid. In other words, under mixing conditions, inference using the
11Formally, the proof of theorem 3.3.2 derives the limit distribution for
√
m(θˆ− θ0). We report
the asymptotic distribution of θˆ for presentation purposes.
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VC estimator is valid, even if the estimator itself is not consistent. This estima-
tor has the advantage of requiring little computational time and to be simple to
implement.
In this section, we have shown that under φ-mixing and some regularity condi-
tions, θ ∈ Θ can be recovered using (3.1). In the next section, we show that an
asymptotic version of the homophily principle is a sufficient condition for φ-mixing,
as defined in assumption 4.
3.4 Models of network formation
3.4.1 A First Example
We now turn to economic models of network formation. We want to find suf-
ficient conditions on hji (gm, x; θ) such that assumption 4 holds. To clarify the pre-
sentation, we start with a simple example. Assume for the moment that
hji = h
j
i [Ni(gm), Nj(gm), d(i, j)]. (3.3)
That is, the value of a link depends only on the (direct) links the individuals
have, and the distance between them. Given this specific dependence structure, we
will show that a weak version of the homophily principle is sufficient to achieve
φ-mixing.
Homophily is a prominent feature of social networks. It characterizes the em-
pirical fact that similar individuals have a higher probability of being linked.12 We
assume the following :
Assumption 7 (Asymptotic Homophily) For all i, j ∈ N ,
(7.1) hji (gm, x; θ)→ −∞ as d(i, j)→∞.
(7.2) limd→∞ exp
{
−hji (gm,x;θ)2
2d
}
∈ [0, 1).
12Many definitions of homophily exist in the economic literature, see for instance Currarini et
al. (2009) and Bramoulle´ et al. (2012). In particular, some papers explicitly define homophily
using a distance function on the space of individual characteristics : for instance, Johnson and
Gilles (2000), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006), and Iijima and Kamada (2010).
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Assumption (7.1) simply says that if the distance between two individuals is
infinite, the probability that they form a link is equal to 0. Condition (7.2) limits
the asymptotic concavity of hji in d. For example, suppose that h
j
i (d) = O(d
η)
for some η. Then, assumption 7.2 holds if η > 1
2
, but not if η ≤ 1
2
. Notice that
assumption 7 only requires that homophily holds asymptotically hence allowing for
a wide range of non-homophilic preferences. We provide an example in section 5.
We show that, under the specification in (3.3), Asymptotic Homophily is suf-
ficient for φ-mixing. Before we present the formal result, we provide a graphical
intuition. Consider Figure 3.1, where we assumed that X = R2. Individuals are
represented as circles, and pairs as stars.
Figure 3.1 – φ-mixing on Networks (I)
A
B
s
s1
s2
r1
r2
r
The φ-mixing condition says that, as the distance between A and B tends
to infinity, the realizations on A and B (i.e. the status of the pairs within those
subsets) are independent. Consider pairs s and r. As the distance between r and
s increases, the distance between the individuals within those pairs (i.e. s1, s2 and
r1, r2) increases as well. Under assumption 7, as the distance between, s2 and r1
goes to infinity, the probability that they form a link goes to zero. Since, under
the specification in (3.3), payoffs only depends on direct links, the status of s will
therefore be independent of the status of r. The argument holds for any pairs in A
and B.
Before presenting the formal statement, we need to add one more regularity
assumption. Recall that a necessary condition for theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 was
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the existence of a minimal distance d0. However, in order to show that asymptotic
homophily is sufficient for φ-mixing, we need to be more specific about the how
the space of individual characteristics is filled as the number of individuals goes to
infinity. Specifically, we assume :
Assumption 8 limm→∞mdT+m η
dm <∞ for all η ∈ [0, 1) and for some  > 0.
where dm represent the fact that the distance increases as m→∞ (increasing
domain).13 This is in essence a distributional assumption for the individuals in X .
It requires that the tails of the distributions are large enough. If the distribution
of individuals on the type is too concentrated, the mixing coefficient φ¯1,∞(r) will
decrease as m increases, but not enough for assumption 4 to hold. Given this last
regularity assumption, we have the following :
Proposition 3.4.1 Let m→∞. Suppose that the payoff function is given by (3.3)
for all i, j ∈ N . Then, assumptions 3, 7 and 8 imply assumption 4.
When the payoffs are only dependent through direct links, it is sufficient to show
that the probability of a link between an individual in a pair in A and an individual
in a pair in B goes to zero fast enough. Since we assumed (assumption 3) that the
error term is normally distributed, this probability decreases at exponential rate,
which is sufficiently fast in the sense of assumption 4.
Assumption 7 is quite natural, and allows to adapt many known theoretical
models to our setting. Consider for instance the “Local Spillover” model from
Goyal and Joshi (2006) :14
hji (gm, x) = ψ(ni(gm)− 1, nj(gm)− 1)− cij
where ψ : N2 → R, and cij is some positive constant. In this example, the value of a
link between i and j is equal to a function of the number of links they have, minus
13Specifically assumption 8 must be satisfied for any sequence dm.
14Formally, we are assuming the homogeneity of the function ψ, compared to their original
model.
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a link-dependent cost. One could adapt their model, and introduce the observed
heterogeneity by letting cij = d(i, j), i.e. a cost equal to the distance between
the two individuals in X . Doing so would guarantee the Asymptotic Homophily
assumption. We now turn to more general network formation processes.
3.4.2 More General Models
Proposition 3.4.1 provides a first encouraging result for the estimation of prefe-
rences on networks. However, the specification in (3.3) excludes many interesting
models of network formation. For instance, one could be interested in the following
model. Let C(gm, λ) = (I− λW)−1W1 be the n× 1 vector of Bonacich centrality
in the network g, represented by the adjacency matrix W, for some λ ∈ (0, 1). The
Bonacich centrality accounts for the total number of links (direct and indirect) an
individual has, and can be interpreted as a measure of popularity.15
Now, define the payoffs as : hji = h(ci(gm, λ), cj(gm, λ), d(i, j)). This payoff func-
tion does not respect the conditions of proposition 3.4.1 since it depends on indirect
links. We will see that we can nonetheless use the same argument to allow for such
models. First, we provide some intuition on the class of models which do not res-
pect the φ-mixing condition. Suppose that the payoff function is of the following
form.16
hji (gm, x) = ψ(ni(gm), nj(gm), L(gm,−i−j))− cij
where L(gm,−i−j) =
∑
k 6=i,j nk(gm,−i−j) is the total number of links in the network
gm,−i−j, obtained from gm by removing all links individuals i and j have in gm.17
In that case, the value of a link depends on the whole network, irrespective of the
individuals’ characteristics. This model does not have the property that the depen-
dence vanishes as the distance between individuals increases, and hence φ-mixing
is not respected. In order to achieve φ-mixing, we have to limit the dependence to
the network structure. Specifically :
15See for instance Mihaly (2009).
16This is a loose adaptation of the “Playing the Field” model from Goyal and Joshi (2006)
17Specifically, gm,−i−j = gm − i1− ...− in− j1− ...− jn.
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Assumption 9 (Component Dependence) For all i, j ∈ N , hji (gm, x; θ) =
hji (gm|Rgij , xRgij ; θ)
This condition states that the dependence through the network is limited to
(finitely) connected individuals. Suppose that the number of individuals in the po-
pulation is finite. Then, the probability that i and j form a link depends only on the
characteristics of the individuals in the same component as i or j.18 When however,
the number of individuals (hence the number of pairs) goes to infinity, we may have
two individuals connected through an infinite path. Assumption 9 states that, in
that case, those individuals can be treated as disconnected. In other words indivi-
duals are unaffected by infinitely distant (in the network) neighbors. Most models
of network formation respect this condition as they assume some decay factor.19 No-
tice that the previous example where hji (gm, x) = ψ(ni(gm), nj(gm), L(gm,−i−j))−cij
does not respect assumption 9. Since hji depends on L(gm,−i−j), the payoff function
may depend on links between individuals not connected to i nor to j.
Now, by analogy to the specification in (3.3), we see that it is sufficient for
assumption 4 to hold to show that the probability that any two individuals, say
s2 and r1 are connected through some path goes to zero, i.e. P (s2 ↔ r1) → 0.
However, this probability does not only depend on the individuals in pairs in A
and B, but also on the individuals in pairs “between” the sets. Figure 3.2 illustrates.
When the number of pairs m (hence the number of individuals n) goes to
infinity, there may exists a path of individuals, each of them separated by a finite
distance, so P (A ↔ B) may well be strictly positive. However, since the distance
between A and B goes to infinity, this path has to be infinite (i.e. contains an
infinite number of individuals). Hence, under assumption 9, the realizations over A
and B are independent. Formally,
Proposition 3.4.2 Assumptions 3, 7, 8 and 9 imply assumption 4 as m→∞.
18A component is a maximally connected subnetwork.
19Links of degree 1 have more influence than links of degree 2, which have more influence
than links of degree 3... and so on. Examples include generalizations the Connection Model from
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and models based on the Bonacich centrality.
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Figure 3.2 – φ-mixing on Networks (II)
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Proposition 3.4.2 shows that the class of models that can be estimated using
(3.1) is quite large. It also provide easy to check conditions for applied researchers
wanting to estimate some arbitrary model of network formation. In practice, provi-
ded that the choosen structural form for hji (g, x; θ) respects Asymptotic Homophily
and Component Dependence, one can estimate θ ∈ Θ using the ML estimator de-
fined in (3.1).
In the next section, we discuss the existence and potential multiplicity of pair-
wise stable networks.
3.4.3 Existence and Multiplicity
In the previous sections, we implicitly assumed that the set of pairwise stable
networks was non-empty, and unique. In general, this may not be true. General
conditions for the existence of a pairwise stable network are well known.20 One re-
sult that is particularly adapted to our setting is the fact that monotone preferences
imply the existence of at least one pairwise stable network. Formally :
Definition 9 (Monotonicity) A payoff function is monotone if for any gm, g
′
m ∈
Gm such that gm ⊆ g′m, we have that hji (gm, x, θ) ≤ hji (g′m, x, θ) for all i, j ∈ N .
20For general existence results for pairwise stable networks, see Jackson and Watts (2001) and
Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007).
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Monotone payoff functions have the convenient property that the set of pairwise
stable networks is non-empty, irrespective of the value of the unobserved term εij.
To see why, consider the following simple algorithm. Starting from the empty net-
work, we add links sequentially if Hji (gm+ij, x; θ, εi) ≥ 0 and H ij(gm+ij, x; θ, εj) ≥
0. The link creation process stops when there exists no such profitable link creation.
Since the payoff function is monotone, the creation of a link increases the value of
the existing links so Hji (g+ ij, x; θ, εi) ≥ 0 implies that Hji (g+ ij + kl, x; θ, εi) ≥ 0
for any link kl. The network generated by this sequential creation of links is then
pairwise stable.
Another issue that has not been addressed is the potential existence of multiple
equilibria.21 A specific feature of pairwise stable networks is the complexity of the
equilibrium set. In general, one cannot explicitly find the set of pairwise stable
networks, as showing existence is already challenging. Also, recall that we assumed
that we observe only one equilibrium of the game, and not the other (potential)
equilibria. Then, in the presence of multiple equilibria, our estimator should not
be interpreted as a QMLE, but remains a well defined a extremum estimator,
where the objective function is a specific feature of the model : the probability that
the observed network is pairwise stable. However, the validity of the estimation
procedure under the potential presence of other potential equilibria is unclear.
Formally understanding the properties of the estimator under multiple equilibria
goes far beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
In the next section, we provides an empirical application of our method using
communication networks.
3.5 Instant Messaging Networks
In this section, we apply the methodology developed in the previous sections
to estimate a model of network formation using a database provided by Yahoo !.
The Instant Messaging (IM) database is particularly well suited to our estimation
21See Bisin et al. (2011), Galichon and Henry (2011), and Tamer (2003).
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strategy as the variance of the observed characteristics is quite large (see Tables
3.II and 3.III).
We use the Yahoo ! IM database which includes data on the communications
among users of their IM service. We assume that there exists a link between two
individuals if we recorded at least one communication between them. The database
includes data on a little more than 20 million individuals. Each individual is cha-
racterized by his age, gender, reported country and Internet usage.22 The precise
description of the variables used can be found in Table 3.I.
We use the following structural model, which assumes that the probability that
two individuals form a link is explained by the local density of the network, the indi-
viduals’ general Internet usage (measured by the number of Yahoo’s pages viewed)
and by the social distance between the individuals. Here, “social distance” means
gender, age, geographical distances, and differences in the topic of the Internet
pages visited (sports, finance, news...). Specifically, we define :
hji (g, x; θ) = θ1(ni(g) + nj(g)) + θ2(PVi + PVj) + θ3∆(Genderij)
+θ4∆(Ageij) + θ5∆
∗(countryij) + θ6∆(PVWeather,ij) (3.4)
+θ7∆(PVNews,ij) + θ8∆(PVFinance,ij) + θ9∆(PVSports,ij)
+θ10∆(PVFlickr,ij) + θ11
where θ1 > 0, and θ11 represents the intrinsic value of a link. The restriction θ1 > 0
is needed to ensure that preferences are monotonic, which implies the existence
of a Pairwise Stable network (see section 3.4.3). It’s easy to show that under the
specification in (3.4), the estimator in (3.1) is globally concave.
22Data was collected in October 2007 using a snowball procedure. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of the database, see Sinan et al. (2009a) and Sinan et al. (2009b).
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Now, a particular issue with our database is that it is far too big to be used
in its totality.25 We then use a random sample of the database. The sub-sampling
procedure is as follows.
First, we randomly select a subset of pairs. Then, for every individuals in every
pairs of the subset, we compute ni(g) and nj(g) over the whole sample. Using this
procedure, our sub-sample includes the total number of links the individuals have,
including links with individuals that are excluded from our sub-sample. The final
sub-sample has 74229 pairs of individuals, including 173781 individuals. Table 3.II
gives summary statistics for individuals, and Table 3.III gives summary statistics
for pairs.
Tableau 3.II – Descriptive Statistics for the individuals
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Gender (Female = 1) 0.598 0.490
Age 29.782 11.494
PV 794.595 1402.652
PVWeather 0.241 2.718
PVNews 3.807 44.494
PVFinance 4.028 115.700
PVSports 13.139 170.008
PVFlickr 6.590 179.007
ni(g) 1.062 2.400
nb countries 228
nb indiv. 173 781
Following Bester et al. (2011), we estimate the specification in (3.4) using
Cluster-Robust standard errors.26 Marginal effects are reported in Table 3.IV. No-
tice that while we assumed θ1 > 0 in (3.4), we did not used that restriction for the
estimation.
25Recall that the number of pairs is m = n(n− 1)/2 ≈ (20 000 000)2/2 = 2× 1014.
26The estimation procedure is simple enough. One can simply use the preprogrammed probit
command available in most statistical packages.
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Tableau 3.III – Descriptive Statistics for the pairs
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Links 0.008 0.090
ni(g) + nj(g) 4.070 3.333
PVi + PVj 1.583 1.988
∆(gender) 0.479 0.500
∆(age) 10.921 12.058
∆∗(country)(1000Km) 6.656 5.829
∆(PVWeather) 0.001 0.008
∆(PVNews) 0.005 0.028
∆(PVFinance) 0.006 0.046
∆(PVSports) 0.014 0.085
∆(PVFlickr) 0.007 0.052
nb. pairs 74 229
3.5.1 Results
The estimation (Table 3.IV) shows that the probability that a link is created
is influenced by the local density of the networks (i.e. ni(g) + nj(g)), as well as
by the general Internet usage. Non-surprisingly, frequent Internet users have a
higher probability of interacting through the IM service. Interestingly, however,
the connectivity of the individuals in the IM network seems to have an additional
positive effect on the probability of creating a link. This could reflect the fact that
frequent users of the IM service have higher probability of interacting together. The
estimation also shows strong effects of the distance on the probability of a link.
The positive effect of the variable ∆(Gender) seems to indicate that the IM service
is highly used by heterosexual couples. The effect of the age distance is negative,
which is coherent with homophily on with respect to the age of the individuals. The
geographic distance seems to have a negative impact, although it is not significantly
different from zero. The proximity in the topic of the Internet pages viewed by the
users also seems to have a negative effect, however the difference in the percentage
of sports pages viewed his captured significantly.
As this application shows, the approach used in this paper is promising as it
has the advantage of being intuitive, flexible, and simple to implement.
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Tableau 3.IV – Estimation Results (Marginal Effects)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
ni(g) + n(g) 0.00049** (0.00008)
PVi + PVj 0.00024* (0.00011)
∆(Gender) 0.00105* (0.00052)
∆(Age) -0.00006* (0.00003)
∆∗(Country) -0.00004 (0.00005)
∆(PVWeather) -0.03598 (0.05562)
∆(PVNews) -0.00045 (0.01775)
∆(PVFinance) -0.00412 (0.00627)
∆(PVSports) -0.00918* (0.00446)
∆(PVFlickr) 0.00124 (0.00457)
Significance levels : ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
3.6 Conclusion and Discussions
In this paper, we have developed a micro-founded econometric model of network
formation which requires the observation of only one social network. We have shown
that an asymptotic version of homophily is sufficient for φ-mixing, which implies
that the estimation of the underlying preference parameters can be achieved using
a simple Maximum Likelihood estimator. The methodology is appealing as it is
simple, and allows to estimate many theoretical models of network formation. We
have provided an empirical application using Yahoo ! Instant Messaging database.
We have shown that the probability that a link is created is strongly influenced
by the local density of the network, by general internet usage, and by the social
distance between individuals.
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CHAPITRE 4
DO PEERS AFFECT STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT ? EVIDENCE
FROM CANADA USING GROUP SIZE VARIATION1
4.1 Introduction
Evaluating peer effects in academic achievement is important for parents, tea-
chers and schools. These effects also play a prominent role in policy debates concer-
ning ability tracking, racial integration and school vouchers (for a recent survey,
see Epple and Romano 2011). However, despite a growing literature on the sub-
ject, the evidence regarding the magnitude of peer effects on student achievement
is mixed (e.g., Sacerdote 2001, Hanushek et al. 2003, Stinebrickner and Stine-
brickner 2006, Ammermueller and Pischke 2009). This lack of consensus partly
reflects various econometric issues that any empirical study on peer effects must
address. Identifying and estimating peer effects raises three basic challenges. First,
the relevant peer groups must be determined. Who interacts with whom ? Second,
peer effects must be identified from confounding factors. Especially, spurious cor-
relation between students’ outcomes may arise from self-selection into groups and
from common unobserved shocks. Third, identifying the precise type of peer effect
at work may be hard. Simultaneity, also called the reflection problem by Manski
(1993), may prevent separating contextual effects, i.e., the influence of peers’ cha-
racteristics, from the endogenous effect, i.e., the influence of peers’ outcome. This
issue is important since only the endogenous effect is the source of a social mul-
tiplier. Researchers have adopted various approaches to solve these three issues ;
we discuss the methods and results of previous studies in more detail in the next
section. As will be clear, however, there is no simple methodological answer to these
three challenges.
1This chapter is a joint work with Yann Bramoulle´, Habiba Djebbari and Bernard Fortin, and
published in The Journal of Applied Econometrics
55
In this paper, we provide, to our knowledge, the first application of a novel
approach developed by Lee (2007) for identifying and estimating peer effects. In
principle the approach is promising, as it allows to solve the problem of correlated
effects and the reflection problem with standard observational (non-experimental)
data. Moreover the exclusion restrictions imposed by the model are explicitly deri-
ved from its structural specification and provide natural instruments. The econo-
metric model does rely on a number of crucial assumptions, however, which makes
its confrontation to real data particularly important. We empirically assess the ap-
proach using original administrative data on test scores at the end of secondary
school in the Canadian province of Que´bec. We investigate the presence of peer ef-
fects in student achievement in Mathematics, Science, French, and History. In the
process, we also provide new economic insights regarding the sources of identifica-
tion in the model. This matters in particular to assess its robustness to alternative
(non-linear) approaches.
The econometric model relies on three key assumptions. First, individuals inter-
act in groups known to the modeler. This means that the population of students is
partitioned in groups (e.g., classes, grade levels) and that students are affected by
all their peers in their groups but by none outside of it. This assumption is typical
in studies of academic achievement but clearly arises from data constraints. Second,
each individual’s peer group is everyone in his group excluding himself. While this
assumption seems innocuous and has been used in most empirical studies, it is a
key source of identification in the model, as it will become clear below. In fact, it
is a main source of difference between Manski’s (1993) and Lee’s models. Manski’s
approach can be interpreted as one in which each individual’s peer group includes
himself.2 Third, individual outcome is determined by a linear-in-means model with
group fixed effects. Thus, the test score of a student is affected by his characteristics
and by the average test score and characteristics in his peer group. In addition, it
2More precisely, Manski studies a social interactions model which, in terms of identification,
has the same properties as a model where individuals interact in groups and each individual is
included in his peer group (see Bramoulle´ et al. 2009).
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may be affected by any kind of correlated group-level unobservable.
Lee (2007) shows that peer effects are identified in such a framework when there
are sufficient groups of different sizes. One important contribution of our paper is
to clarify the economic intuition behind identification. Regarding the estimation of
parameters, one potentially important limitation of the method, however, is that
convergence in distribution of the peer effect estimates may occur at low rates when
the average group size is large relative to the number of groups in the sample (Lee
2007). This is also intuitive : excluding the individual or not from his peer group
does not change much when its size is relatively large.
Here two remarks are in order. First, these results are to be distinguished from
the idea that the group size is a factor in a school’s production function (e.g.,
Krueger 2003). In Lee’s model, the effects of group sizes which are separable from
the peer effects are controlled for by fixed effects in the structural model. Second,
Lee’s identification method differs from the variance contrast approach developed
by Graham (2008). The basic idea in this approach is that peer effects will induce
intra-group dependencies in behavior that introduce variance restrictions on the
error terms. These restrictions are used to identify the composite (endogenous +
contextual) social interaction effects under the assumption that the variance matrix
parameters are independent of the reference group size.
We use administrative data on academic achievement for a large sample of se-
condary schools in the Province of Que´bec obtained from the Ministry of Education,
Recreation and Sports (MERS). Our dependent variables are individual scores on
four standardized tests taken in June 2005 (Math, Sciences, French and History)
by fourth and fifth grade secondary school students. All 4th and 5th grade students
in the province must pass these tests to graduate. One advantage of these data is
that all candidates in the province take the same exams, no matter their school
and location. This feature effectively allows us to consider test scores as draws
from a common underlying distribution. Another advantage is that our sample is
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representative and quite large. We have the scores of all students for a 75% ran-
dom sample of Que´bec schools which, over the four subjects, yields 194,553 test
scores for 116,534 students. In terms of interaction patterns, the structure of the
data leads us to make the following natural assumption. We assume that the peer
group of a student contains all other students in the same school qualified to take
the same test in June 2005. In practice, a small number of students postpone test-
taking to August 2005. We extend Lee’s methodology in the empirical modeling to
address this issue. However, since the difference between observed group sizes and
actual group sizes is small, the correction has little effect on the results. Following
Lee (2007), we estimate the model in two ways : through generalized instrumen-
tal variables (IV) and, under stronger parametric conditions, through conditional
maximum likelihood robust to non-normal disturbances (pseudo CML).
Our results are mixed though consistent with the model. We do provide evidence
of some endogenous and contextual peer effects. Based on pseudo CML estimates,
we find that the endogenous peer effect is positive, significant and quite high in
Math (0.83). Moreover it is within the range of previous estimates (see Sacerdote
2011 for a recent survey). However, the effect is smaller and non significant in
History (0.64), French (0.30), and Science (−0.23).3 Endogenous peer effects esti-
mates obtained from IV methods are highly imprecise with our data even in Math.
The higher precision of our pseudo CML estimates is consistent with results in
Lee (2007) showing that CML estimators are asymptotically more efficient than IV
estimators. As regards contextual peer effects, we find evidence that some of them
matter, based on both pseudo CML and IV estimators. For instance, results from
pseudo CML indicate that interacting with older students (a proxy for repeaters)
has a negative effect on own test score in all subjects except Math (not significant).
It is remarkable that even with large average group size relative to the number
of groups, we are able to identify some peer effects. However there is also much
3The effect of individual characteristics, such as gender, age, and socioeconomic background,
on test scores are precisely estimated by either method, and these estimates generally conform to
expectations.
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dispersion in group sizes within our samples. We suspect that this helps identifica-
tion. We study this issue systematically through Monte-Carlo simulations. We find
that indeed increasing group size dispersion has a positive impact on the precision
of estimates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss past research
in section 4.2 and present our econometric model and the estimation methods
in section 4.3. We describe our dataset in section 4.4. We present our empirical
results in section 4.5 and run Monte Carlo experiments in section 4.6. We conclude
in section 4.7.
4.2 Previous research
In this section, we give a brief overview of the recent literature on student
achievement and peer effects, and we explain how our study complements and
enhances current knowledge on peer interactions in academic outcomes.4
As discussed above, measuring peer effects is complex as it raises three basic
interrelated problems : the determination of reference groups, the problem of cor-
related effects and the reflection problem. The choice of reference groups is often
severely constrained by the availability of data. In particular, there are still few
databases providing information on the students’ social networks ; the Add Health
dataset is an exception, see e.g. Calvo-Armengol et al. (2009) and Lin (2010).5 For
this reason, many studies focus on the grade-within-school level (e.g., Hanushek et
al. 2003, Angrist and Lang 2004). Other studies analyze peer effects at the class-
room level (e.g., Kang 2007, Ammermueller and Pischke 2009). The administrative
data we use in this study do not provide information on classes or teachers. The-
refore, we assume that for each subject the relevant reference group for a student
4For two recent comprehensive surveys on peer effects in education, see Sacerdote (2011) and
Epple and Romano (2011).
5Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) determine conditions under which endogenous and contextual peer
effects are identified when students interact through a social network known by the modeler and
when correlated effects are fixed within subnetworks. See also section 3.4.2. in this paper.
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taking the test contains all other students in the same school who have completed
all courses in the subject matter by June 2005. Thus, given that the reference group
is likely to include students from other classes, one should probably expect peer
effects to be smaller than at the classroom level.6
Two main strategies have been used to handle the problem of correlated effects.
A first strategy has been to exploit data where students are randomly or quasi-
randomly assigned within their groups (e.g., Sacerdote 2001, Zimmerman 2003,
Kang 2007). Results on the impact of contextual effects using randomly assigned
roommates as peers are usually low though significant. However, Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner (2006) have argued that these studies tend to underestimate true
peer effects as the true influence of roommates is unclear. A second strategy uses
observational data to estimate peer effects. This approach is usually based on two
assumptions. First, fixed effects allow to take correlated effects into account. With
cross section data, these effects are usually defined at a level higher than peer
groups. Otherwise, peer effects are absorbed in these effects and cannot therefore
be identified. For instance, Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) introduce school
fixed effects to estimate peer effects at the class level for fourth grader in six
European countries. Contrary to this approach, our model allows to include fixed
effects at the peer group level even with cross-section data. This is so because each
student within a group has his own reference group (since he is excluded from
it). The second assumption is that one observes exogenous shocks to peer group
composition which allow to identify a composite (endogenous + contextual) peer
effect. The strategy uses either cross-section or panel data. With cross-section data,
demographic variations across grades but within schools are usually exploited (see
Bifulco et al. 2010). With panel data, demographic variations across cohorts but
within school-grades are usually exploited (see Hanushek et al. 2003).
The reflection problem is handled using two main strategies. In most papers,
6In fact, at the end of secondary level, classes and teachers are usually different depending on
the subject matter taught.
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no solution for this difficult problem is provided. Rather, researchers estimate
a reduced-form linear-in-means model, and no attempt is made to separate the
contextual and endogenous peer effects. Only composite parameters are estimated
(Sacerdote 2001, Ammermueller and Pischke 2009). Note however that a number of
these papers (often implicitly) assume that there are no contextual effects. In this
case, the composite parameter(s) allow(s) to identify the endogenous peer effect.
In a second strategy, one uses instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the
endogenous peer effect (e.g., Evans et al. 1992, Gaviria and Raphael 2001). The
problem here is to choose suitable instruments. For instance, Rivkin (2001) argues
that the use of metropolitan-wide aggregate variables as instruments in the Evans
et al. (1992) study exacerbates the biases in peer effect estimates. In our paper,
we provide some results based on instrumental methods. However, our instruments
are naturally derived from the structure of the model.
In short, various strategies have been proposed to address the three basic issues
that occur in the estimation of peer effects. But most rely on strong assumptions
that are difficult to motivate and may not hold in practice. Some of them require
panel data while others rely on experiments that randomly allocate students within
their peer group. This makes the results in Lee (2007) particularly interesting, as
they show that both endogenous and contextual peer effects may be fully identified
even with observational data in cross-section.
4.3 Econometric model and estimation methods
4.3.1 Econometric model
We review and adapt the structural model suggested by Lee in the context of
our application. Lee’s model builds on and extends the standard linear-in-means
model of peer effects (Moffitt 2001) to groups with various sizes. The set of students
{i = 1, ...M} is supposed to be partionned into groups of peers indexed by r =
1, ..., R. Let Mr be the r
th group of peers, of size mr. All students in the same
group have the same number of peers since they interact with all others in the
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group. We assume that student i who belongs to group r is excluded from his own
reference group. Let Mri be student i’s group of peers, of size mr − 1. A peer is
any fellow student whose academic performance and personal characteristics may
affect i’s performance. Let yri be the test score obtained by student i. Let xri be
a 1 ×K vector of characteristics of i and Xr be the mr ×K matrix of individual
characteristics. For expository purposes, the model is first presented with a unique
characteristic (K = 1), defined by his family socio-economic background. Another
departure from the linear-in-means model is the inclusion of a term αr that captures
all group invariant unobserved variables (e.g., same learning environment, similar
preferences of school or motivation towards education). The error term ri reflects
other unobservable characteristics associated with i.
We do not change any other assumption of the linear-in-means model. In par-
ticular, we assume that a student’s performance to the standardized test may be
affected by the average performance in his group of reference, by his family socioe-
conomic background, and by the average socioeconomic background in his group.
Formally, the basic structural equation is given by :
yri = αr +β
∑
j∈Mri yrj
mr − 1 +γxri + δ
∑
j∈Mri xrj
mr − 1 + ri, E(ri| Xr,mr, αr) =0, (4.1)
where β captures the endogenous effect, γ the individual effect and δ the contextual
effect. Observe that eq. (4.1) can be derived from the first-order conditions of a
choice-theoretic non-cooperative (Nash) model where each student’s performance
is obtained from the maximisation of his quadratic utility function which depends
on his individual characteristics, his performance and his reference group’s mean
performance and mean characteristics.
Importantly, we assume strict exogeneity of mr and {xri : i = 1, ...,mr} condi-
tional on the unobserved effect αr, i.e., E(ri| Xr,mr, αr) =0. This exogeneity as-
sumption can notably accommodate situations where peer group size is endogenous.
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Suppose that, everything else equal, brighter students attend smaller schools, i.e.,
schools where the cohort of students eligible to take the province-wide test in the
subject matter (our peer groups) is small. In this case, peer group size mr may
well depend on unobserved common characteristics of the student’s group, αr :
E(αr| Xr,mr) 6=0. Our model allows for this type of correlation. However, condi-
tional on these common characteristics, peer group size mr is assumed to be inde-
pendent of the student’s idiosyncratic unobserved characteristics :
E(ri| Xr,mr, αr) =0. We maintain this assumption throughout our analysis.
To eliminate group-invariant correlated effects, we next apply a within trans-
formation to eq. ( 4.1). In particular, as we noted above, when the effect of group
size is separable from peer and individual effects, it is captured by αr. The model
can address the problem of selection or endogenous peer group formation. For ins-
tance, school choice may depend on some unobserved factors specific to a school (
e.g., reputation, unobserved quality) and determine the type of students who are
attracted by these schools. The advantage of the within transformation is that we
compare students of the same type. This transformation also allows to control for
common environment effects. Resources available at the school level (e.g., teaching,
physical infrastructure) may affect the performance of all the students. Again, by
comparing students within the same school, we can abstract from these effects. The
within reduced form equation for students in the rth group can be written as :
yri − y¯r =
γ − δ
mr−1
1 + β
mr−1
(xri − x¯r) + 1
1 + β
mr−1
(εri − ε¯r) (4.2)
where means y¯r, x¯r and ¯r are computed over all students in the group. Now assume
that γβ+ δ 6= 0. Only one composite parameter can be recovered from the reduced
form for each group size mr. At least three sizes are thus necessary to identify the
three structural parameters β, γ and δ.7
7It is easy to show that when γβ + δ = 0, only γ is identified.
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4.3.2 Interpretation of identification
The fact that the parameters of the structural within eq.(4.2) may be fully
identified is quite surprising, and deserves some elaboration. Indeed, under the
alternative assumption that means are inclusive, that is, i ∈Mri, peers are the same
for everyone in a group Mri = Mr, and peer effects cannot be separated out from
group fixed effects. So somehow assuming that the individual is excluded from his
own peer group allows to solve two difficult identification problems : distinguishing
true peer effects from correlated effects and further distinguishing endogenous from
contextual peer effects. Intuitively, where does identification come from ?
Suppose first that the endogenous effect is absent β = 0. Note that each indi-
vidual has different peers : i 6= k implies that Mri 6= Mrk. A first key observation
is that, within a group, individual attributes xi are perfectly negatively correlated
with mean peer attributes (
∑
j∈Mri xj)/(mr − 1).8 Thus, students with an ability
above average necessarily have peers with a mean ability below average, and vice
versa. If the individual and the contextual effects γ and δ are positive, this negative
correlation tends to reduce the dispersion in outcomes. In such a group setting, peer
effects lower the difference in achievement between high and low ability students.9
Formally, the impact of the difference in attributes on the difference in outcomes
changes from γ to γ − δ/(mr − 1) when introducing peer effects [see eq. (4.2)].
So variations in group sizes can be used to identify contextual peer effects. The
second key observation is that this reduction is stronger in smaller groups. The
variance in mean peer attributes is simply higher in smaller groups, reflecting the
relatively larger effect of excluding one individual from the mean. And as group size
increases, mean peer attributes converge to the group mean, and peer effects have
increasingly less bite on how differences in covariates affect differences in outcomes.
Next, consider the reflection problem. Observe that outcomes are subject to a
8To see this, observe that
∑
j∈Mri xj = (
∑
j∈Mr xj)−xi. So if xi < xk then 1mr−1
∑
j∈Mri xj >
1
mr−1
∑
j∈Mrk xj .
9In contrast if γ > 0 and δ < 0, this negative correlation helps amplify the dispersion in
outcomes.
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similar negative correlation : within a group, students with grades above average
necessarily have peers with grades below average. So if β > 0, endogenous peer
effects lead to a further reduction in outcome dispersion. However, simultaneity
now implies that this decrease in impact is non-linear in the peer coefficient : from
γ − δ/(mr − 1) to (γ − δ/(mr − 1))/(1 + β/(mr − 1)) [see eq. (4.2)]. The difference
in the shapes of impact reduction can then be used to identify endogenous from
contextual peer effects.
Finally, this understanding is useful to assess the robustness of the identification
strategy to changes in the econometric model. In particular, it is easy to see that
if xi < xk then the distribution of attributes in i’s peer group Mri first-order
stochastically dominates the distribution in Mrk. So identification is likely to hold,
in general, if we replaced the mean in equation (1) by the median, the variance, or
many other moments of the distribution.10
4.3.3 Treatment of missing values
One problem we face in our sample is that we do not always observe the scores
of all students within a group. For instance, some students may postpone test-
taking to the next session due to illness. We next use a correction first developed
by Davezies et al. (2009) to allow for this possibility. Our setting is one where
the total number of students (including those who postpone test-taking) in each
group is known, but we only observe the test scores of subsamples Nr of size nr
of each group Mr, with nr ≤ mr and
R∑
r=1
nr = N . We assume that a student’s
decision to postpone exam-taking is random or depends on the observable strictly
exogenous variables, conditional on the fixed group effect. We show how to adapt
Lee’s analysis to this more general setting. Let Lr be the complement of Nr, i.e. ,
10Of course, one has to address a basic modeling question first, that is, whether the implied
model is coherent. A model has this property when a specific nonlinear structure generates a
unique solution for outcomes.
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Lr = Mr −Nr.11 The structural equation becomes :
yri = α˜r+β
∑
j∈Nri yrj
mr − 1 +γxri+δ
∑
j∈Nri xrj
mr − 1 +ri, E(ri| Xr,mr, αr) = 0, (4.3)
where i now denotes an observed individual in the sample (but not any one in the
rth group) and α˜r = αr + β
∑
j∈Lr yrj
mr−1 + δ
∑
j∈Lr xrj
mr−1 is the new group fixed effect.
Under our assumptions, estimators are consistent, even if we do not observe test
scores for all students in each group. Moreover, effects stemming from unobserved
individuals are the same for all the individuals observed in the sample from the
rth group. They are therefore picked up by the group fixed effect. Using the within
transformation, one obtains the same equation as (4.2) but where means y¯r, x¯r and
¯r are computed only over all observed students in the group.
4.3.4 Estimation methods
4.3.4.1 CML Estimator
We consider estimation under both pseudo Conditional Maximum Likelihood
(or CML) and Instrumental Variables (or IV) identification conditions.
To present pseudo CML and IV estimators, it is easier to express eq. (4.3) in
matrix notations. We now allow for any number of characteristics, so that γ is a
K × 1 vector of individual effects and δ a K × 1 vector of contextual ones. Recall
that in this setting, students are affected by all others in their group and by none
outside of it. This means that the observed social interactions can be modelled
as a N × N block-diagonal matrix G = Diag(G1, ...,GR), such that for all r,
Gr is comprised of elements grij =
1
mr−1 if i 6= j and grii = 0. In other terms,
Gr =
1
mr−1(ιnrι
′
nr − Inr), where ιnr is a nr × 1 vector of ones and Inr the identity
matrix of dimension nr. Eq. (4.3) can be re-written in matrix form as follows :
yr = ιnr α˜r + βGryr + Xrγ + GrXrδ + r, (4.4)
11If Nri denotes the group of peers of student i, we also have Lr = Mri −Nri.
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where E(r | Xr,Gr, α˜r)=0.
Applying the operator matrix Jr = Inr − 1nr ιnrι
′
nr allows us to obtain deviations
with respect to the mean for the observed group members. Pre-multiplying eq. (4.4)
by Jr eliminates the group fixed effect and yields :
Jryr = βJrGryr + JrXrγ + JrGrXrδ + Jrr (4.5)
Elementary linear algebra tells us that JrGr = − 1mr−1Jr. Letting JrAr = A∗r, we
obtain
mr − 1 + β
mr − 1 y
∗
r = X
∗
r
(mr − 1)γ − δ
mr − 1 + 
∗
r
which is equivalent to eq. (4.2).
To derive the pseudo CML estimator, we assume (possibly wrongly) that the
ir’s are i.i.d. N(0, σ
2). It follows that, given Xr, mr, and nr, the pseudo density
of y∗r is a multivariate normal distribution with mean X
∗
r
(mr−1)γ−δ
mr−1+β and variance
(σ mr−1
mr−1+β )
2Jr.
12 The pseudo log likelihood function to be maximized can then be
expressed as follows :
lnL = c+
R∑
r=1
(nr − 1) ln (mr − 1 + β)− N −R
2
ln
(
σ2
)
− 1
2σ2
R∑
r=1
(
mr − 1 + β
mr − 1 y
∗
r −X∗r
(mr − 1)γ − δ
mr − 1
)′
×(
mr − 1 + β
mr − 1 y
∗
r −X∗r
(mr − 1)γ − δ
mr − 1
)
,
where c is a constant. This log likelihood function excludes any fixed effects. It is a
conditional log likelihood function as it is conditional on the sufficient statistics yr,
(as well as on the Xr’s, the mr’s, and the nr’s), for r = 1, ...R. Under the assumption
that the ir’s are correctly specified and i.i.d. N(0, σ
2), Lee (2007) shows that the
CML estimators of β, γ, δ and σ are consistent and asymptotically efficient under
regularity conditions and provided there is sufficient variation in group sizes.
12Note that only nr − 1 elements of ∗r are linearly independent.
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Even if the assumed density of y∗r is misspecified, the pseudo CML estimator
is consistent provided that the conditional mean of the y∗r ’s is correctly specified.
This is the case since the normal density belongs to the Linear Exponential Family
(see Gourieroux et al. 1984). Of course, the estimator is no longer asymptotically
efficient. Moreover, one has to compute the robust covariance matrix using the
sandwich formula J−1IJ−1, where J is minus the expectation of the Hessian ma-
trix and I the expectation of the outer-product-of-the-gradient matrix. A further
advantage of this computation is that it allows us to see whether an apparent
precision of CML estimators is driven by the normality assumption used in Lee
(2007).
4.3.4.2 2SLS and Generalized 2SLS estimators
Alternatively, the structural equation (4.4) can be estimated by instrumental
(IV) methods. To see how the methods work, define a N×N block-diagonal matrix
J = Diag(J1, ...,JR). Concatenating eq. (4.5) over all groups yields :
Jy = βJGy + JXγ + JGXδ + J. (4.6)
where y (resp. X) is obtained by stacking the vectors yr (resp. the matrices Xr),
for r = 1, ..., R.
The reduced form of the model is :
Jy = (I−βG)−1(JXγ + JGXδ) + (I− βG)−1J. (4.7)
Identification can be given a natural interpretation in terms of instrumental va-
riables. If i /∈ Mri and there are at least three different group sizes, E[JGy|X,G]
is not perfectly collinear to (JX,JGX) and the model is identified [see Bramoulle´
et al. (2009) for more details]. Moreover JG2X can be used as a matrix of valid
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instruments for JGy.13
One advantage of an IV approach over pseudo CML is that it requires less
structure. Specifically, we do not assume that the specified density function of the
yr’s, potentially partially misspecified, is normal. Also we do not use the structure
on the error terms for identification purpose. Thus, identification in this case is
semi-parametric, or “distribution-free”. Of course, this comes at a price : the IV
estimator is asymptotically less efficient than the pseudo CML, since the latter
imposes more structure on the distribution of error terms.
In addition, we can derive a Generalized IV estimator as proposed in Kelejian
and Prucha (1998), and discussed in Lee (2007). Assuming homoskedasticity, it
yields an asymptotically optimal (best) IV estimator and reduces to a two-step
estimation method in our case. More precisely, our first step consists in estima-
ting a 2SLS as described above, by using as instruments S = (JX,JGX,JG2).
The second step consists in estimating a G2SLS estimator using as instruments
Ẑ = (ĴGy,JX,JGX), where ĴGy is computed from the reduced form ( 4.7)
premultiplied by G and using the first-step estimates.
4.4 Data
We gathered for this analysis original data from the Que´bec Government MERS.
These administrative data provide detailed information on individual scores on
standardized tests taken in June 2005 on four subjects (Math, Sciences, French
and History) by fourth and fifth grade secondary school students. They also include
information on the age, gender, language spoken at home and socioeconomic status
of students. Sampling has been done in two steps. The population of interest is the
set of all fourth and fifth grade secondary school students who are candidates to the
MERS examinations in June 2005. This population is comprised of 152,580 students
13In fact, JrGr = − 1mr−1Jr and JrG2r = 1(mr−1)2 Jr, hence instruments are built here by
premultiplying characteristics (in deviation) by group-dependent weights and by stacking them
across groups.
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in total. In the first step, a 75% random sample of secondary schools offering fourth
and fifth grade classes in the 2004-2005 school year have been selected. In the second
step, all fourth and fifth grade students in these schools have been included. Overall,
we have 194,553 individual test scores for 116,534 students.14
There are many advantages to the use of our data. First, all 4th and 5th grade
students must take tests on these four subjects to qualify for secondary school
graduation. This means that our results do not pertain to a selected sample of
schools. In particular, both public and private school students have to take these
tests. Another advantage is that the tests are standardized, i.e., designed and
applied uniformly within the province of Que´bec. We use test results gathered by
the MERS, so there is less scope for measurement error with these data than with
survey data on grades. Finally, although survey data may have provided information
on a larger set of covariates, sample sizes in our study are larger than in typical
school surveys.
Given the lack of information on the structure of relevant social interactions,
we assume that the peer group for a student taking a test is comprised of all other
students in the same school who are qualified to take the test in June 2005. Two
test sessions are offered for those who completed coursework in the Spring semester.
We thus consider as belonging to the same group all those who belong to the same
school and who take a subject test in one of the two consecutive sessions of June
and August 2005. We know the number of students in each of these groups. But we
only observe test scores for the set of students who took the test in June. Therefore
we do not always observe the scores of all students within a group. We offered a
correction for this problem in our discussion of the econometric model, and our
empirical results below incorporate this correction. In any case an overwhelming
majority of the students do take the tests in June, so the correction has little effect
on the results.
14There are more individual test scores than students as some students take test in more than
one subject matter.
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We use for this study French, History, Science and Math test results as reported
in the MERS administrative data. Students in a regular track take History and
Science tests in Secondary 4. The French test is commonly taken in Secondary
5. Finally, we focus on students who take the Math test in Secondary 5 (Math
514). This completes their mathematical training for secondary school. Note that
the MERS administers a unique test to all secondary school students in French,
History and Science. In contrast, it administers different tests in Math, depending
on academic options chosen early on by the students. We report here results for
students following the regular mathematical training (Math 514). We focus on this
test in our analysis.
We provide descriptive statistics in Table III.I.15 For each subject, the dependent
variable in our econometric model is the test score obtained in the provincial stan-
dardized test. The average score is between 70% and 75% in French, Science and
History tests. It is lower and about 62% in Math. In samples for which the regular
track for the test is Secondary 5 (resp. Secondary 4), the average age of students
is close to 16 (resp. 15). Most students taking French and Math (98% and 96%)
are enrolled in Secondary 5. Most of those taking Science and History are enrolled
in Secondary 4 (92% and 96%). Between 52% and 55% of students are female, and
between 11% and 13% of students speak a language at home which is different
from the language of instruction (Foreign variable).16 Between 30% and 34% of
students come from a relatively high socioeconomic background and between 40%
and 42% from a medium one. We use an index of socio-economic status provided
by the MERS. This index is computed from data from the 2001 census. It uses
information on the level of education of the mother (a weight of 2/3) and the job
status of parents (weight of 1/3). Low socio-economic status corresponds to the
three lowest deciles of the index (high socio-economic status to the three highest
deciles).
15All Tables can be found in appendix III.
16The language of instruction is French in most schools, and English otherwise.
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We observe test scores and characteristics of students taking the same test in
June 2005. Sample sizes are 41, 778 for French, 54, 981 for Science, 15, 771 for Math,
and 55, 057 for History. We also observe the number of students who completed
coursework but postpone test-taking to August 2005. There are 118 students post-
poning French, 186 postponing History, 195 postponing Science, and 160 postpo-
ning Math. We observe between 314 and 382 peer groups depending on the subject
matter considered. The average group size is between 50 (Math) and 146 (Science).
The ratio between the number of groups and the average group size varies between
2.36 (French) and 7.23 (Math). These numbers are relatively small, which suggests
that our estimates could be subject to weak identification problems. The group
size standard deviation is quite large, however, varying between 50 (in Math) and
about 135 (in Science and History). We expect such dispersion in group sizes to
help identification. We analyze these issues in more details in Section 4.6.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 CML and pseudo CML estimates
Table III.II reports the results of maximum likelihood estimation with unrobust
(CML) and robust (pseudo CML) standard errors. The model estimated is the
linear-in-means model with group fixed effects, individual impacts, and endogenous
and contextual peer effects. We find that the estimated endogenous peer effect
lies between −0.24 and 0.83. Using unrobust standard errors (in brackets), the
endogenous effect is significantly different from zero and positive for Math (β̂ =
0.82), and History (β̂ = 0.65). It is not significant for French (β̂ = 0.33) and for
Science (β̂ = −0.23). Based on robust standard errors, it is no longer significant
for History (p-value= 10,82%) but still significant for Math. One thus concludes
that regarding this peer effect, inference appears to be driven by normality for one
subject (History). In general standard errors are larger using pseudo CML than
CML, but their differences are not so important.
Two reasons may explain why the endogenous peer effects in Math is significant
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in our sample. First, the standard error of the estimates is smaller in Math than in
other subjects. This is consistent with the fact that the average group size relative to
the number of groups is close to three times smaller in Math than in other subjects.
Second, our endogenous effect estimate is much larger in Math (0.82). How does
this result compare with other studies ? Sacerdote (2011) has recently provided a
survey of studies of endogenous peer effects in test scores for primary and secondary
schools based on linear-in-means models (see his Table 4.2.). Interestingly, in most
reported studies (5 over 6) which analyze achievement in both Math and Reading,
the endogenous peer effect is larger in Math. In addition, this effect is often very
high and exceeds the value we have estimated. Thus Hoxby (2000) reports a 1.7
to 6.8-point increase in own score in relation with a 1-point increase in mean score
of peers in some specifications. Betts and Zau (2004) show a 1.9-point increase
in association with a 1-point increase in mean math score of peers. On the other
hand, Hanushek et al. (2003) obtain a Math peer effect of 0.4.17 So our estimate
lies on the average to high side of the range of previous estimates. Observe finally
that our results in Math are larger than those usually obtained in studies based
on randomized experiments (e.g., Sacerdote 2001, Zimmerman 2003). One possible
explanation is that peers used in these papers are often people from the same
dorm. These individuals do not necessary represent those who exercise significant
influence on students’ scholar achievement.
The relatively large endogenous peer effect in Math may reflect the fact that
mathematics provide more opportunities for interactions among students. And,
probably more than in other subjects, it may also reflect general effects such as
disruption. For instance, it is likely that success in Math requires much concen-
tration in class from the average student. Now suppose that there is a student
(with low grade in Math) in class who is characterized by his propensity to disrupt
learning by bad behavior or asking poor questions. His behavior may have large
negative effects on his peers’ scholar achievement (e.g., see Lazear 2001) and thus
17Kang (2007, p. 475) also provide a survey of endogenous peer effects in achievement in
mathematics which is broadly consistent with results reported in Sacerdote (2011).
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generates strong endogenous peer effects.
Regarding the individual characteristics, most of them have a significant effect
on test scores, and the signs of these effects essentially conform to expectations.
All test scores decrease significantly with age. Since older students have often re-
peated a grade, being younger is a natural proxy for ability. Test scores are signifi-
cantly higher for female students than for male students, except for History where
male students perform significantly better than female students. This is broadly
consistent with results from previous studies. For instance, results from the 2000
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) show that Que´bec female
students perform better than males on reading literacy tests but that the differences
in performance on mathematics and science tests are smaller and not significant
(see Que´bec Government 2001). Similarly, in our analysis, the difference in perfor-
mance is quantitatively large in French but much smaller in the other disciplines.
The performance of foreign students is, non surprisingly, significantly lower than
for non-foreign students on the French test, but higher for Science and History and
not significantly different for Math. Secondary 5 students tend to perform signi-
ficantly better on all tests than Secondary 4 students, which reflects the positive
impact of an additional year of schooling on test scores. Finally, students from a
higher socioeconomic category perform significantly better in all tests.
As far as contextual variables are concerned, a few of them have a significant
impact on student performance. Average age of other students has a negative and
significant effect on all test scores except Math where it is positive but not signifi-
cant. These results also conform our expectations. When the number of repeaters
rises (as reflected by an increase in mean age of our peers at a given grade level),
this will tend to reduce own test score. Proportion of other students enrolled in
Secondary 5 have a large positive and significant effect on own score in French.
Peers’ socioeconomic background has little effect on own schooling performance.
The proportion of female students among peers has a positive and significant effect
in Math. When significant, the magnitude of contextual effects is always larger
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than the magnitude of individual effects. This is not surprising as it captures the
effect of a unit change in the characteristic of every other student in the group.18
4.5.2 Reflection problem
One way of addressing the simultaneity problem without exploiting group size
variations is to exclude at least one contextual variable from the outcome equation
and to use it as an instrument for average test score. We estimate a model similar
to the one presented in Table III.II but excluding contextual effects that are not
individually significant in the pseudo CML specification (i.e., for which the null
that δ = 0 is not rejected) ; see Table III.VI. Using likelihood ratio tests, we reject
the null that these δ’s are jointly equal to zero for French but not for the other
subjects. This suggests that the exclusion restrictions may be valid for these latter
samples. Therefore, the pseudo CML estimators provided in Table III.VI should
be consistent and asymptotically more efficient than those provided in Table III.II
for the Science, Math and History tests. Results however appear to be robust to
these new specifications. Observe finally that we could not have known this a priori
without an estimation of the full model.
Overall, this shows the interest of Lee’s solution to the reflection problem. Es-
timating a model with both endogenous and contextual peer effects is needed to
recover the different types of peer effects at work.
4.5.3 2SLS and G2SLS estimates
Tables III.III, and Table III.VII provide the 2SLS and G2SLS estimation re-
sults of the linear-in-means model of peer effects with group fixed effects, individual
impacts, and endogenous and contextual peer effects. In contrast to the CML and
pseudo CML estimates of Table III.II, none of the endogenous effects is statistically
significant. This is consistent with Lee’s (2007, p. 345) result that the asymptotic
18We have also estimate a second-order pseudo CML in which restrictions are directly incorpo-
rated in the variance term and estimated. Results are quite similar with those presented in Table
III.III.
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efficiency of IV estimators is smaller than that of the CML. Estimated individual
effects are quite similar to the corresponding CML estimates. Some contextual ef-
fects are similar while others are different. For instance, the proportion of other
students in Secondary 5 still has a large and positive effect on own French score
as well as no significant effects for the other subjects. In contrast, average age
among peers now has a positive and significant effect on own score for most sub-
jects, rather than a negative one. This could be explained by differences in small
sample properties of both methods, possibly aggravated by the imprecision in the
estimation of the endogenous peer effect.
Table III.III also reports two standard test results giving information on ins-
trumental variables properties. We first look at Sargan tests on the validity of
instruments and the over-identification restrictions of the model. We do not reject
the null for Science, Math and History, but we reject it for French. While this may
indicate a problem of model specification in this last case, one must be cautious in
interpreting the test given the likely low convergence of peer effects IV estimates.
We then compute Stock and Yogo test statistics on weak identification. Based on
the definition that a group of instruments is weak when the bias of the IV esti-
mator relative to the bias of ordinary least squares exceeds a certain threshold b,
say 5%, one rejects the null that the instruments are weak for all subject matters.
Finally, Hausman tests have been performed to test the equality of pseudo CML
and G2SLS estimators. Under the null, both of these estimators are consistent,
but pseudo CML estimators are asymptotically more efficient ; under the alterna-
tive, G2SLS estimators are consistent whereas pseudo CML estimators are not. For
each subject, we could not reject the null. This suggests the absence of specification
errors in the model.
4.6 Monte Carlo simulations
In this section, we study through simulations the effect of group sizes and their
distribution on the precision and bias of our estimates. Lee (2007) shows that the
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CML and IV estimators may converge in distribution at low rates when the ratio
between the the number of groups and the average group size is small. Since this
ratio varies between 2.36 and 7.23 in our samples, a problem of weak identification
could in principle emerge. However, the standard deviation of the distribution of
group sizes is also relatively large (see Table III.I), and we suspect that this may
help identification. To study these issues, we realize two simulation exercises. First,
we vary group sizes in a systematic manner and study how this affects the bias
and precision of estimators. To focus on the approach which provides the most
reasonable findings in our empirical analysis, we report results on the model using
CML.19 We look at uniform distributions, vary the size of the distribution’s support
and partly calibrate simulation parameters on our data. Second, we look at bias
and precision of estimates for fully calibrated simulations, when group sizes are
exactly the same as in the data. Overall, while our analysis confirms Lee’s earlier
results, we also find a strong positive impact of the dispersion in group sizes on
the strength of identification. Especially, conditional maximum likelihood performs
well on fully calibrated simulations. This suggests that the bias due to small sample
issues is likely low in the results presented in Table III.II.
For each simulation exercise, we keep the number of observations fixed around
42, 000, and run 1, 000 replications. We first consider average sizes of 10, 20, 40, 80
and 120. We pick group sizes from the following intervals with decreasing length :
• Average size of 10 : [3, 17], [5, 15], [7, 13] and [9, 11],
• Average size of 20 : [3, 37], [8, 32], [13, 27] and [18, 22],
• Average size of 40 : [3, 77], [12, 68], [21, 59], [30, 50] and [39, 41],
• Average size of 80 : [3, 157], [18, 142], [33, 127], [48, 112] and [63, 97],
• Average size of 120 : [3, 237], [28, 212], [53, 187], [78, 162] and [103, 137].
19 In an earlier version of the paper, we also provided results for IV estimates. Basically, the
results are qualitatively the same for IV as those for CML but, as expected, the magnitude of the
bias and the loss in precision are always larger for IV than for CML.
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For each of the intervals described above, we proceed in the following manner :
- pick a group size from a uniform distribution for which the support is defined
by the minimum and maximum value of the interval ;
- truncate this value by eliminating its decimal portion ;
- repeat step 1 and 2 as long as the total number of observations is below or equal
to 42, 000.
To reduce computing time, we assume that students have the same characteris-
tics except for age and gender. We assume that age follows a normal distribution
and gender follows a Bernoulli distribution. We calibrate the moments of these
distributions on the sample of students taking the French test : average age is 16,
variance of age is 0.25, and proportion of girls is 0.55. Values of the structural pa-
rameters β, γ and δ are set close to the estimated coefficients for the French test :
β = 0.35, γage = −8, γgender = 3.8, δage = −40, δgender = −25.
We assume that the values of  in the structural equation are drawn randomly
from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2 = 1. We generate the
endogenous variable y from the reduced-form equation in deviation form.
Looking at Table III.IV, we first compare simulation results across average
group sizes and then we examine how estimators perform for a given average group
size as dispersion in group size decreases. Separate horizontal panels in Table 4
pertain to different values of average group size. We report the average estimated
coefficient and standard error for the endogenous effect (first vertical panel), the
contextual effect associated with age (second vertical panel) and the contextual
effect associated with gender (third vertical panel). We find that even for the largest
average group size (i.e., 120), CML may perform well in terms of bias and precision
(first line in the last horizontal panel of Table 4). The biases of CML get in general
larger as average group size increases. The CML estimate of the endogenous effect
attains a plateau at the value 1. This is consistent with the fact that the CML
estimator tends towards the naive OLS estimator as group sizes become larger. In
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general, peer effects are also less precisely estimated in large groups than in small
groups.
Our main new result concerns the effect of group size dispersion. When we
fix the value of the average group size and reduce the length of the interval from
which group sizes are picked, we find that the bias of CML typically increases while
the precision typically decreases. In Table III.IV, this amounts to looking at each
horizontal panel separately. Observe however that since we roughly pick group sizes
from a uniform distribution holding average group size fixed, reducing the interval’s
length affects the two parameters of the size distribution (i.e., the minimum and
maximum value of its support) and a number of its moments. In particular, this
leads to a reduction in variance and to an increase in the size of the smallest groups.
In general, both the variance and the size of smallest groups may matter and the
strength of identification may depend on the size distribution in complex ways. We
leave a deeper investigation of this issue to future research.
We next fully calibrate the simulations’ parameters on the data. We use obser-
ved group sizes in the French sample, calibrate the model parameters
{β, γage, γgender, δage, δgender} and moments of the explanatory variables as previously,
and set the variance of the error term in the structural equation equal to the esti-
mated variance in the French sample (σˆ2 = 154.7). Simulation results which now
report both CML and IV estimates are reported in Table III.V. The CML esti-
mator has small bias and standard error, while the IV estimator is not precisely
estimated and the bias is large. These results confirm for CML what we obtained
from picking group sizes at random ; they show that dispersion in group sizes help
identification. Besides, this suggests that small sample bias may be relatively high
in the IV estimates of Tables III.III, and of Table III.VII but relatively low for the
CML estimates of Table III.II.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis of social interactions in scholar achievement
when students interact through groups. Based on a linear-in-means approach with
group fixed effects (Lee 2007), we make two main contributions regarding the iden-
tification and estimation of peer effects. First, we provide a new intuition for identi-
fication. We show that full identification of the model relies on three key properties :
(1) Since the individual is excluded from his peer group, above average students
have below average peers (with respect to any attribute). Therefore, when indivi-
dual and peer effects are positive, peer effects then tend to reduce the dispersion in
outcomes. (2) This reduction is stronger in smaller groups, reflecting the larger ef-
fect of excluding one individual from the mean. (3) Contextual and endogenous peer
effects generate reductions of different shapes, which allow to identify both of them.
Second, as regards the estimation of peer effects, the model is applied to origi-
nal administrative data providing individual scores on standardized tests taken in
June 2005 in four subjects by fourth and fifth grade secondary school students in
the Province of Que´bec (Canada). Based on a pseudo conditional maximum like-
lihood approach, our results indicate that students significantly benefit from their
peers’ higher test scores in Math but not in other subjects such as Science, History
and French. Two reasons may explain these results. First, this is likely to reflect
the fact that Math provides more opportunities for interactions among students.
Second, in our sample, the average group size (relative to the number of groups)
is close to three times smaller in Math that in other subjects. As suggested by Lee
(2007), accurate estimation of peer effects requires relatively small groups. This is
also confirmed by our Monte Carlo simulations. These results should be warning
applied researchers in the future against using data in which the size of groups is
too large. Besides, our simulations indicate that, for a given average group size,
increasing group size dispersion improves the precision of peer effects estimates.
In fact, our results suggest that, conditional on estimating on the whole sample,
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even data on larger groups may provide useful information for estimation purposes.
The basic intuition is that data on very large groups can be used to provide more
precise individual effects estimators. In turn, this indirectly provides more efficient
estimates of the peer effects from data on smaller groups. So, future estimations
of Lee’s model may benefit from data with relatively small average group size but
relatively large group size dispersion, including both small and large groups.
In terms of public policy, the fact that the endogenous peer effects appear to be
very large in Math suggests that a reform that improves the amount and quality of
Math learning is likely to yield very high returns in terms of scholar achievement.
This is so since such a reform will not only have direct effects on student per-
formance in Math but also strong indirect effects through the additional external
benefits generated by the social multiplier. Remarkably, our analysis also shows
that the indirect peer effects of the reform will reduce performance inequalities in
Math across students. This is the case because low-ability students have better
peers (since their peers exclude them) and high-ability students have worse peers
(for the same reason). Moreover, the strong negative effects of the average age of
peers on scholar achievement (except in Math) suggest that resources invested by
the government to reduce the number of repeaters may have an important indirect
positive impact on student performance. One limitation of Lee ’s linear-in-means
approach is that it imposes that average test score over all schools are not influen-
ced by a reallocation of students across schools (see Sacerdote 2011). Therefore, the
model does not have much to say about issues such as optimal school composition
by race or ability.
Our research could be extended in many directions. It would be interesting
to evaluate the validity of this approach by using data where group membership
is experimentally manipulated and group sizes are heterogenous (as in Sacerdote
2001). One could also analyze how group size variations may help to identify peer
effects when the outcome is a discrete variable (e.g., pass or fail). Brock and Durlauf
(2007) have studied peer effects identification with discrete outcomes but they
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ignore group size variations. A third potentially fruitful direction of research would
be to analyze a nonlinear version of Lee’s approach. Thus, student achievement
could depend on the mean and standard deviation of peers attributes. Overall,
we think that this first empirical application confirmed the interest of the method.
Many more applications in different settings are needed, however, in order to gain a
thorough understanding of the method’s advantages, limitations, and applicability
for public policy.
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CHAPITRE 5
CONCLUSION
Comme discute´ dans l’introduction au chapitre 1, les essais de cette the`se
s’inte´ressent a` la fois a` l’analyse de P(G|X) et de P(y|G,X). Je prend ici le temps
de discuter quelques limites de ces approches et certaines avenues potentielles pour
la recherche future.
Une des faiblesses de la lite´rature sur la formation de re´seaux est leur limitation
en terme d’implications sur les politiques publiques. Bien suˆr, eˆtre capable d’iden-
tifier quelles variables socioe´conomiques influencent le processus de formation d’un
re´seau est un premier pas important. Par contre, le fait est que les causes pour
lesquelles ces variables sont importantes demeurent en grande partie inconnues.
La raison est que P(G|X) repre´sente une forme re´duite de plusieurs phe´nome`nes,
i.e. P(G|y(X),X). Par exemple, supposons que y repre´sente la consommation de
cigarettes d’adolescents et que cette consomation soit influence´e par le niveau
d’e´ducation des parents de ces adolescents. Supposons aussi que la consommation
de cigarettes soit une variable importante quant a` la formation de liens d’amitie´.
L’e´tude de P(G|X) identifiera le niveau d’e´ducation des parents comme une variable
importante en ce qui a` trait a` la formation de liens d’amitie´ chez les adolescents. Si
cela est vrai, malheureusement, l’approche par forme re´duite ne permet pas d’iden-
tifier la raison pour laquelle X influence G. L’e´tude de P(G|y,X) quant a` elle est
loin d’eˆtre triviale en raison de l’endoge´ne´ite´ de y. L’identification de l’impact de
y et X sur G est l’un des de´fis importants a` surmonter.
Du coˆte´ de la litte´rature sur les effets de pairs, le proble`me inverse se pose.
L’e´tude de P(y|G,X) permet de bien identifier les effets importants pour la cre´ation
de politique publiques. Par contre, l’endoge´ne´ite´ potentielle de G peut eˆtre
proble´matique en pratique. Dans le cas ou les interactions se font en groupe (comme
au chapitre 4), ce proble`me est moins important. Par contre, lorsque les effets de
pairs passent, par exemple, par un re´seau d’amitie´s, il se peut tre`s bien d’une va-
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riable inobserve´e affecte la formation du re´seau, ce qui entraˆıne naturellement un
biais dans l’estimation de y.
Une avenue prometteuse est l’e´tude de la probabilite´ jointe P(y,G|X). C’est
entre autres cette avenue qui est emprunte´e par Goldsmith-Pinkham et Imbens
(2012), ou` les auteurs e´tudient P(y,G|X) = P(y|G,X) · P(G|X). Encore ici, par
contre, P(G|X) repre´sente une forme re´duite comprenant simultane´ment plusieurs
effets. De plus, on comprend encore mal les fondement microe´conomiques de ce
genre de models. C’est-a`-dire, supposons que les individus choisissent en premier
lieu le re´seau G, et ensuite leur action y sur ce re´seau. Quelles sont les conditions
sur P(y|G,X) et P(G|X) tel que (y,G) soit un e´quilibre parfait en sous-jeu ?
La litte´rature empirique sur les re´seaux sociaux est donc encore jeune et il existe
encore beaucoup plus de questions que de re´ponses. A` la lumie`re des phe´nome`nes
identifie´s dans cette the`se je reste convaincu que beaucoup de re´ponses passeront
par une meilleure compre´hension des incitatifs des agents, donc par la cre´ation de
mode`les microe´conomiques oriente´s vers une application empirique.
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Annexe I
Appendix I
I.1 Appendix I.1
Proof of lemma 2.3.1
Let x∗ be some NE, and suppose that (i, j) is a deviating pair in the sense of a
WBE. Let (x˜i, x˜j) be some joint deviation for (i, j). We need to show that x˜
j
i > x
j∗
i
and x˜ij > x
i∗
j .
Since (x˜i, x˜j) is a profitable deviation (in the sense of a WBE), we have
ui(x˜i, x˜j, x
∗
−i−j) > ui(x
∗) (I.1)
uj(x˜i, x˜j, x
∗
−i−j) > uj(x
∗)
Since x∗ is a NE, we have
ui(xi, x
∗
−i) ≤ ui(x∗) (I.2)
uj(xj, x
∗
−j) ≤ uj(x∗)
for all xi, and xj. In particular, condition (I.2) holds for xi = x˜i and xj = x˜j.
Putting conditions (I.1) and (I.2) together, we have : ui(x˜i, x˜j, x
∗
−i−j) > ui(x˜i, x
∗
−i)
and uj(x˜i, x˜j, x
∗
−i−j) > uj(x˜j, x
∗
−j). Since the utility function is linear in the links,
this is equivalent to vi(x˜
j
i , x˜
i
j, dij) > vi(x˜
j
i , x
i∗
j , dij) and vj(x˜
j
i , x˜
i
j, dij) > vj(x˜
i
j, x
j∗
i , dij).
The production functions are strictly increasing in the second argument, so we
must have x˜ji > x
j∗
i and x˜
i
j > x
i∗
j . (If x
j∗
i = x
i∗
j = 0, we have vi(x˜
j
i , x˜
i
j, dij) > 0 and
vj(x˜
i
j, x˜
j
i , dij) > 0, and the result is straightforward.) 
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Proof of theorem 2.3.2
First, we show that x˜ produced by the assignment algorithm (see appendix B)
is a NE. By construction, we have vi(ξ, ξ, dij) ≥ 0, and wi(ξ) ≥ 0, hence removing
a link is never profitable. Now, the only link that an individual can unilaterally
create is the individual link. Suppose that it is profitable to do so for i ∈ N . Then
either [δi < κi and wi(ξ) > 0], or [δi = κi and wi(ξ) > minj∈gi vi(ξ, ξ, dij)]. By
construction, both are impossible.
Now, suppose that x˜ is a NE, but not a WBE. That is, there exists i, j ∈ N
such that j /∈ gi (from lemma 2.3.1, since xji ∈ {0, ξ}) who want to deviate, i.e.
create a link between them. There are 2 cases :
1. δi = κi. Then, i needs to remove a link in order to create a new link. (Since
x˜ is a NE, he won’t remove more than one link.) Then, this implies that
there exists k ∈ gi such that vi(ξ, ξ, dij) > vi(ξ, ξ, dik) ≥ 0. This implies that
dij < dik.
We now turn to j. If δj = κj, the same argument applies for j, then vj(ξ, ξ, dij) >
vj(ξ, ξ, djl) for some l ∈ gj (and vi(ξ, ξ, dij) > vi(ξ, ξ, dik)). Since we have
dij < dik and dij < djl, this contradicts the fact that x˜ was created by the
assignment algorithm.
If δj < κj, j has at least ξ to invest. Together with the fact that dij < dik,
this contradicts the fact that x˜ is produced by the assignment algorithm.
2. δi < ki and δj < kj. This is impossible since, from the assignment algorithm,
it implies that vi(ξ, ξ, dij) < 0 or vj(ξ, ξ, dij) < 0.

Proof of theorem 2.3.3
We need to show that the allocation x˜ ∈ X, which is produced by the assignment
algorithm (see appendix B), is a WBE of Γ.
xviii
We first show that x˜ is a NE. Suppose that it is not ; that is, there exists i ∈ N
such that x˜i is not individually rational. Since for any i, j ∈ N , we have xji ∈ {0, ξ}.
This means that i wants to create an additional link. (Unilaterally reducing the
investment in a link necessarily lowers i’s payoff.) The only link that i can create
on his own is the individual link. There are two cases :
1. x˜ii = 0 and δi < κi. Then, by construction from the assignment algorithm,
this implies that wi(ξ) < 0. So i has no individual profitable deviation, since
wi(x˜
j
i ) < wi(ξ).
2. x˜ii = 0 and δi = κi. Then, if i has a profitable deviation, there exists J ⊆ gi
such that wi(
∑
j∈J j) >
∑
j∈J{vi(ξ, ξ, dij) − vi(ξ − j, ξ, dij)}. That is, i is
reducing his investments in links in J in order to invest in his individual link.
Let d∗ = maxj∈J dij, we have
wi(
∑
j∈J
j) >
∑
j∈J
{vi(ξ, ξ, dij)− vi(ξ − j, ξ, dij)}
≥
∑
j∈J
{vi(ξ, ξ, d∗)− vi(ξ − j, ξ, d∗)} (I.3)
≥ vi(ξ, ξ, d∗)− vi(ξ −
∑
j∈J
j, ξ, d
∗) (I.4)
where (8) follows from vxd(x, ξ, d) ≤ 0, and (9) follows from vxx(x, ξ, d) ≥ 0.
Now, since vxx(x, ξ, d) ≥ 0, if (8) is true for
∑
j∈J j < ξ, it is also true for∑
j∈J j = ξ, hence wi(ξ) > vi(ξ, ξ, d
∗). This contradicts the fact that x˜ was
created by the assignment algorithm.
We still need to show that x˜ is a WBE. Suppose that it’s not, i.e. there exists
(i, j) and (xi, xj) such that ui(xi, xj, x˜−i−j) > ui(x˜) and uj(xj, xi, x˜−i−j) > uj(x˜).
From the construction of x˜, it must be the case that i, j are such that x˜ji = x˜
i
j = 0.
Again, we have 2 cases :
1. δi < κi and δj < κj. This is impossible since, from the assignment algorithm,
it implies that vi(ξ, ξ, dij) < 0.
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2. δi = κi. Then, if i has a profitable deviation, there exists K ⊆ gi such
that vi(
∑
k∈K k, x
i
j, dij) >
∑
k∈K{vi(ξ, ξ, dik) − vi(ξ − k, ξ, dik)}. Let d∗i =
maxk∈K dik, we have
vi(
∑
k∈K
k, x
i
j, dij) >
∑
k∈K
{vi(ξ, ξ, dik)− vi(ξ − k, ξ, dik)}
≥
∑
k∈K
{vi(ξ, ξ, d∗i )− vi(ξ − k, ξ, d∗i )} (I.5)
≥ vi(ξ, ξ, d∗i )− vi(ξ −
∑
k∈K
j, ξ, d
∗
i ) (I.6)
where (10) follows from vxd(x, ξ, d) ≤ 0, and (11) follows from vxx(x, ξ, d) ≥ 0.
Now, since vxx(x, ξ, d) ≥ 0, if (11) is true for
∑
k∈K k < ξ, it is also true for∑
k∈K k = ξ, hence vi(ξ, x
i
j, dij) > vi(ξ, ξ, d
∗
i ).
We now turn to j. If δj = κj, the same argument applies for j ; then vj(ξ, ξ, dij) >
vj(ξ, ξ, d
∗
j) (and vi(ξ, ξ, dij) > vi(ξ, ξ, d
∗
i )). Since we have dij < d
∗
i and dij < d
∗
j ,
this contradicts the fact that x˜ was created by the assignment algorithm.
If δj < κj, j has at least ξ to invest (and it is profitable to invest up to ξ since
vx(x, y, d) > 0), then together with the fact that dij < d
∗
i , this contradicts
the fact that x˜ is produced by the assignment algorithm.

Proof of proposition 2.3.4
From theorem 3.3, it is sufficient to show that for any i, j ∈ N , xji ∈ {0, ξ}, at
any NE.
Consider some i, j ∈ N , and suppose that xji ∈ (0, ξ). I show that this implies
that there exists k ∈ N such that xki ∈ (0, ξ). Suppose otherwise. Then, i still
has resources available. Since vx(x, y, d) > 0, i could increase x
j
i and be better off.
Hence, x is not a NE, so it is not a WBE. Hence, there exists k ∈ N \{i} such that
xki ∈ (0, ξ). There are 2 cases :
xx
1. [k = i]. Since x is a NE, we must have the following.
• If xii + xji ≥ ξ, then
wi(x
i
i) + vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) ≥ wi(ξ) + vi(xji + xii − ξ, xij, dij)
wi(x
i
i) + vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) ≥ wi(xji + xii − ξ) + vi(ξ, xij, dij)
Rewriting, we have
wi(ξ)− wi(xii) ≤ vi(xji , xij, dij)− vi(xji + xii − ξ, xij, dij)
wi(x
i
i)− wi(xji + xii − ξ) ≥ vi(ξ, xij, dij)− vi(xji , xij, dij)
Since vxx(x, y, d) > 0, we have vi(ξ, x
i
j, dij)−vi(xji , xij, dij) > vi(xji , xij, dij)−
vi(x
j
i + x
i
i − ξ, xij, dij), and since w′′(x) > 0, we have wi(ξ) − wi(xii) >
wi(x
i
i)−wi(xji+xii−ξ). This is in contradiction with the above conditions,
hence x is not a NE.
• If xii + xji < ξ, then
wi(x
i
i) + vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) ≥ wi(xii + xji ) + vi(0, xij, dij)
wi(x
i
i) + vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) ≥ wi(0) + vi(xii + xji , xij, dij)
Rewriting, we have
wi(x
i
i + x
j
i )− wi(xii) ≤ vi(xji , xij, dij)− vi(0, xij, dij)
wi(x
i
i)− wi(0) ≥ vi(xii + xji , xij, dij)− vi(xji , xij, dij)
Since vxx(x, y, d) > 0, we have vi(x
j
i + x
i
i, x
i
j, dij) − vi(xji , xij, dij) >
vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij)− vi(0, xij, dij), and since w′′(x) > 0, we have wi(xji + xii)−
wi(x
i
i) > wi(x
i
i) − wi(0). Again, this is in contradiction with the above
conditions, hence x is not a NE.
xxi
i 6= k and i 6= j .
Since x is a NE, we must have the following :
• If xki + xji ≥ ξ, then
vi(x
k
i , x
i
k, dik) + vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) ≥ vi(ξ, xik, dik) + vi(xji + xki − ξ, xij, dij)
vi(x
k
i , x
i
k, dik) + vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) ≥ vi(xji + xki − ξ, xik, dik) + vi(ξ, xij, dij)
Rewriting, we have
vi(ξ, x
i
k, dik)− vi(xki , xik, dik) ≤ vi(xji , xij, dij)− vi(xji + xki − ξ, xij, dij)
vi(x
k
i , x
i
k, dik)− vi(xji + xki − ξ, xik, dik) ≥ vi(ξ, xij, dij)− vi(xji , xij, dij)
Since vxx(x, y, d) > 0, we have vi(ξ, x
i
j, dij)−vi(xji , xij, dij) > vi(xji , xij, dij)−
vi(x
j
i +x
k
i −ξ, xij, dij), and vi(ξ, xik, dik)−vi(xki , xik, dik) > vi(xki , xik, dik)−
vi(x
j
i +x
k
i −ξ, xik, dik). This is in contradiction with the above conditions,
hence x is not a NE.
• If xii + xji < ξ, then
vi(x
k
i , x
i
k, dik) + vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) ≥ vi(xji + xki , xik, dik) + vi(0, xij, dij)
vi(x
k
i , x
i
k, dik) + vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) ≥ vi(0, xik, dik) + vi(xji + xki , xij, dij)
Rewriting, we have
vi(x
j
i + x
k
i , x
i
k, dik)− vi(xki , xik, dik) ≤ vi(xji , xij, dij)− vi(0, xij, dij)
vi(x
k
i , x
i
k, dik)− vi(0, xik, dik) ≥ vi(xji + xki , xij, dij)− vi(xji , xij, dij)
Since vxx(x, y, d) > 0, we have vi(x
j
i + x
k
i , x
i
j, dij) − vi(xji , xij, dij) >
vi(x
j
i , x
i
j, dij) − vi(0, xij, dij), and vi(xji + xki , xik, dik) − vi(xki , xik, dik) >
vi(x
k
i , x
i
k, dik) − vi(0, xik, dik). This is in contradiction with the above
conditions, hence x is not a NE.
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
Proof of proposition 2.3.5
The proof is obvious from the proof of theorem 2.3.2 and theorem 2.3.3. One
only has to remark that for any i, j, k ∈ N , vi(ξ, ξ, dij) ≥ vi(ξ, ξ, dik) implies that
vi(ξ, ξ, dij) > vi(ξ, ξ, dik) if we assume that dij 6= dkl. 
Proof of proposition 2.3.7
The fact that any Strong NE needs to be produced by the assignment algorithm
follows from propositions 2.3.2 and 2.3.4. Suppose that x∗ ∈ X is a BE, but not a
Strong NE. There exists S ⊂ N and xS ∈ ×i∈SXi such that ui(xS, x∗−S) > ui(x∗)
for all i ∈ S. We will show that under Strict Convexity or Finiteness, this implies
that there exists a bilateral deviation.
Under Finiteness, xi ∈ {0, ξ}n for all i ∈ S. Using the same argument as the
one used in lemma 2.3.1, there exist at least one project created under a deviation
by coalition S. That is, ∃i, j ∈ S, such that xj∗i = xi∗j = 0 and xji = xij = ξ. Since
the utility functions are additive, this implies that i, j have a profitable bilateral
deviation. Since resources invested in the link (i, j) must have come either from
unused resources or from the deleation of another link since xji ∈ {0, ξ} for all
i, j ∈ N .
Under Convexity, if it is profitable to withdraw resources from one link and
invest in two new links, it is even better to invest in only one of those links. (This
is exactly the argument used in proposition 2.3.3). Specifically, suppose that there
exists i, j, k ∈ S such that xji , xki > 0, and xj∗i = xk∗i = 0. Then, either xji = ξ and
xki = 0 or x
j
i = 0 and x
k
i = ξ is better for i. Then, i is willing to make a bilateral
deviation with j (wlog). Since the utilities are linear, it is also profitable for k (since
it is under a joint deviation in S). Hence, there exists a bilateral deviation between
i and j. 
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I.2 Appendix I.2
The Assignment Algorithm
I generate a network g (represented by the adjacency matrix A) in which every
individual invests as much as possible in every active link (i.e. xji ∈ {0, ξi} for all
i, j ∈ N).
Let ηji = vi(ξ, ξ, dij) for all i, j ∈ N such that i 6= j, and ηii = wi(ξ), for all
i ∈ N . This function represents the value of a link between two individuals. Now,
define the (not necessarily unique) ordered list L0 as follows : L0 = (dij)i,j∈N :i<j,
such that L01 ≤ L02 ≤ ... ≤ L0m. The list L0 is an ordered list of distance values, for
all pairs of individuals. The number of elements in L0 is the number of possible
pairings between individuals in N , i.e. n(n−1)/2. Let L0l be the element of position
l in the list L0. I note (L0l )
−1 = (i, j) if L0l = dij.
The algorithm computes g and takes Lt = L0 as inputs. It operates in two steps.
1 Take the first element of the list Lt, i.e. Lt1. Let L
t
1 = dij.
If aii = 0 or ajj = 0,
1. If ηii ≥ ηji and ηii ≥ 0, then aii = 1
2. If ηjj ≥ ηij and ηjj ≥ 0, then ajj = 1
Otherwise,
1. If ηji ≥ 0 and ηij ≥ 0, then set aij = aji = 1.
2. If ηji < 0, then generate L
∗i = Lt \ {dik}k∈N :dik∈Lt. (That is, remove all
distances associates with i, since all the following distances will be greater
than dij.)
3. If ηij < 0, then generate L
∗i = Lt \ {djk}k∈N :djk∈Lt, i.e. do the same for j as
we did for i.
Generate Lt+1 = {(d ∈ Li∗ ∩ Lj∗) \ dij}.
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2 Repeat (1) for t = 1, .... until |Lt| = 0 or until ∃i ∈ N such that δi = κi.
For all i ∈ N such that δi = κi, generate L∗i = Lt \ {dik}k∈N :dik∈Lt. (That
is, remove all distances associated with i, since he has no resources left.) Then,
generate Lt+1 = ∩i∈NLi∗ and repeat (1).
After the algorithm stops, I generate the allocation x˜ as follows. For all i, j ∈ N ,
if aij = 1, x˜
j
i = ξ, otherwise x˜
j
i = 0. Notice that by definition x˜ ∈ X.
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I.3 Appendix I.3
The Likelihood Function
I assume that no individual is isolated. The definition of structural homophily
is : For all ij /∈ g, dij ≥ dik for all k ∈ gi or dij ≥ djk for all k ∈ gj. Then, since the
εij are independents, and ln(d) ≥ ln(d′) iff d ≥ d′, the probability that g exhibits
structural homophily is
Πij /∈g
{
Πk∈giP(dij ≥ dik) + Πk∈gjP(dij ≥ djk)− Πk∈giP(dij ≥ dik)Πk∈gjP(dij ≥ djk)
}
This gives :
P(dij ≥ dik) = P(
R∑
r=1
βrρr(θi, θj) + εij ≥
R∑
r=1
βrρr(θi, θk) + εik)
At this point, the normalization of ε is necessary for the identification of β.
Simplifying the last expression, we have :
P(dij ≥ dik) = P(Z ≥
R∑
r=1
βr[ρr(θi, θk)− ρr(θi, θj)])
= 1− Φ(
R∑
r=1
βr[ρr(θi, θk)− ρr(θi, θj)])
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I.4 Appendix I.4
Figure I.1 – Standard deviation : 10
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Figure I.2 – Standard deviation : 12
Figure I.3 – Standard deviation : 14
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Figure I.4 – Standard deviation : 16
Annexe II
Appendix II
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Under assumption 5.1, it is sufficient to show that :1
sup
θ∈Θ
|Lm(θ)− E(Lm(θ))| →a.s. 0, as m→∞.
In order to show that this condition hold, it is sufficient to show that the conditions
of theorem 2 and 3 from Jenish and Prucha (2009) hold. Specifically,
1. d(r, s) > d0 > 0 for any r, s ∈ Sm
2. (Θ, ‖.‖) is a totally bounded metric space.
3. Domination :
lim sup
m→∞
1
|Sm|
m∑
s=1
E(q¯ps,m1{q¯ps,m>k})→ 0 as k →∞,
for some p ≥ 1, and where q¯s,m = supθ |qs,m(zs,m|x, gm, θ)|.
4. Stochastic equicontinuity : For every  > 0,
limsupm
1
|Sm|
m∑
s=1
P (sup
θ′∈Θ
sup
θ∈B(θ′,δ)
|qs,m(θ)− qs,m(θ′)| > )→ 0 as δ → 0,
where B(θ′, δ) is the open ball {θ ∈ Θ : ‖(θ′ − θ)‖ < δ}.
5. supm sups∈Sm E[supθ∈Θ |qs,m(θ)|(1+η)] <∞ for some η > 0.
6.
∑∞
d=1 d
T−1φ¯1,1(d) <∞.
1see for instance Gallant and White (1988), pp.18.
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Condition 1 is implied by assumption 5.2. Condition 2 is verified by construction,
and condition 5 and 6 are just assumption 5.3 and φ-mixing(2). Conditions 3 and
4 hold from the following : Under condition 5, supθ |qs,m(zs,m|x, gm, θ)| is L(1+η)
integrable which implies the uniform L(1+η) integrability of |qs,m(zs,m|x, gm, θ)|.
The next lemma shows that assumption 5.4 implies condition 4.
Lemma II.0.1 Condition 4 is implied by assumption 5.4.
Proof From the mean value theorem, we can write
qs,m(θ) = qs,m(θ
′) +
∂qs,m(θ˜)
∂θ
(θ − θ′),
Thus,
|qs,m(θ)− qs,m(θ′)| ≤ |∂qs,m(θ˜)
∂θ
|‖(θ − θ′)‖
≤ sup
θ∈Θ
|∂qs,m(θ)
∂θ
|‖(θ − θ′)‖.
According to Proposition 1 of Jenish and Prucha (2009), qs,m(θ) is L0 stochastically
equicontinuous on Θ if the following Cesa`ro sums is finite. i.e
limsupm
1
|Sm|
m∑
s=1
E(sup
θ∈Θ
|∂qs,m(θ)
∂θ
|) <∞.
However, under assumption 5.4, each term of the Cesa`ro sums is finite, in the sense
that supm sups∈Sm E[supθ∈Θ |∂qs,m(θ)∂θ |] <∞. This fact completes the proof. 
From the previous lemma, conditions 1-6 are respected, hence theorem 2 and 3
from Jenish and Prucha (2009) apply. This completes the proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 3.3.2
We want to show that
√
m(θˆm − θ0) ⇒ N(0, D0(θ0)−1B0(θ0)D0(θ0)−1). From
the mean value theorem, we have that
∂Lm(θˆm)
∂θ
=
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
+
∂2Lm(θm)
∂θ∂θ′
0 =
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
+
∂2Lm(θm)
∂θ∂θ′
(θˆm − θ0).
and
√
m(θˆm − θ0) = −
√
m[
∂2Lm(θm)
∂θ∂θ′
]−1
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
= −[∂
2Lm(θm)
∂θ∂θ′
]−1[
σm√
m
][σ−1m Qm],
where σ2m = V ar(Qm) and Qm =
∑m
s=1
∂qs,m(θ0)
∂θ
.
Then, it is sufficient to show the following :
1. σ
2
m
m
→ B0(θ0) ;
2. σ−1m Qm ⇒ N(0, I) ;
3. [∂
2Lm(θm)
∂θ∂θ′ ]→p D0(θ0).
Again, we proceed in a series of lemmata.
Lemma II.0.2 Under assumptions 5.1, σ
2
m
m
→ B0(θ0).
Proof
1
m
σ2m =
1
m
V ar(m
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
)
= mE[
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ′
] +mE[
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
]E[
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ′
]
= mE[
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
(
∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
)′
].
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where the last inequality holds since E[∂Lm(θ0)
∂θ
] = 0, as θ0 maximizes E[Lm(θ)]
(Assumption 5.1). Hence, σ
2
m
m
→ B0(θ0). 
Lemma II.0.3 Under assumptions 3, and 6, σ−1m Qm ⇒ N(0, I)
Proof It is sufficient to show that the conditions for theorem 1 from Jenish and
Prucha (2009) hold. Specifically,
1. d(r, s) > d0 > 0 for any r, s ∈ Sm.
2. φ-mixing on Random Fields.
3. supm sups∈Sm E[supθ∈Θ |∂qs,m(θ)∂θ |2] <∞.
4. lim infm→∞
σ2m
m
> 0.
Condition 1 is implied by assumption 5.2. Condition 3 is just assumption 6.5,
and condition 4 is implied by lemma II.0.2. 
Lemma II.0.4 ∂
2Lm(θm)
∂θθ′ →p D0(θ0)
Proof The proof is identical to the proof for the consistency of θˆ, replacing qs,m(θ)
by Ds,m(θ), and using assumptions 6.3 and 6.4 instead of assumptions 5.3 and 5.4.

Putting together lemmata 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Let Hji = h
j
i [Ni(g), Nj(g), d(i, j)] + εij where ε ∼ N(0, 1). We show that under
assumption 7 and 8, φ-mixing is respected. Recall that φ(A,B) = sup{|P (A|B)−
P (A)|, A ∈ A, B ∈ B, P (B) > 0}. Formally, A and B are subsets of pairs, i.e.
A,B ∈ Sm. Let i ∈ s ∈ A and j ∈ s ∈ B.
We have that P (A) = P (A|∃ij ∈ g)P (∃ij ∈ g) + P (A|@ij ∈ g)P (@ij ∈ g) and
P (A|B) = P (A|B ∩ ∃ij ∈ g)P (∃ij ∈ g) + P (A|B ∩ @ij ∈ g)P (@ij ∈ g). Since the
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payoff function only depends on direct links, P (A|B ∩ @ij ∈ g) = P (A|@ij ∈ g).
Hence, we can rewrite
φ(A,B) = φ(A,B|∃ij ∈ g)P (∃ij ∈ g)
Since, for any A,B, φ(A,B) ∈ [0, 1], we have that φ(A,B) ≤ P (∃ij ∈ g). Let
h¯(d) = supθ supg supij h
j
i (g, x, d; θ) and h(d) = infθ infg infij h
j
i (g, x, d; θ). We then
have that φ¯k,l ≤ 4klΦ[h¯(d)] since there can be a maximum of 2k individuals in A
and 2l individuals in B. That is, the sum of the probabilities for each possible pairs
between A and B, and for the maximal value for hji . Notice that by the properties
of the Hausdorf distance, if d(i, j) ≥ c for some c > 0 and all i ∈ s ∈ A and
j ∈ r ∈ B, then d(A,B) ≥ c.
Now, we know that the Chernoff bound for Φ is such that Φ[h¯(d)] ≤ 1
2
exp{−1
2
h¯(d)2}
for h¯(d) < 0, which is true for d big enough from assumption (7.1). Then, a suf-
ficient condition for assumption (4.1) and (4.2) is φ¯k,l(d) ≤ 2kl exp{−12 h¯(d)2} for
k + l ≤ 4 or equivalently :
dT−1φ¯k,l(d) ≤ 2kldT−1 exp{−1
2
h¯(d)2}
for all d > d¯ for some d¯ > 0 and k + l ≤ 4. Then, assumption (4.1) and (4.2) hold
if
∑∞
d=1 d
T−1 exp{−1
2
h¯(d)2} converges. According to Cauchy’s rule, this last sum
converges if limd→∞ exp
{
− h¯(d)2
2d
}
∈ [0, 1). Which is true under assumption (7.2).
Now, φ-mixing (3) is different since l = ∞, so the upper bound goes to infi-
nity. Specifically, condition (3) implies that there exists C > 0, m, d such that
dT+φ¯1,m(d) ≤ C, for some  > 0, for all m > m and d > d. Using the Chernoff
bound again we have that dT+φ¯1,m(d) is bounded when m goes to infinity if
lim
m→∞
mdT+m exp
{
− h¯(dm)
2
2dm
}
<∞
assuming the increasing domain assumption 8, and the asymptotic homophily as-
sumption (7.2). 
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
Let P (A↔ B) be the probability that there exist a path between an individual
in a site in A and and individual in a site in B. Using the same argument as in
the proof of proposition 3.4.1, we have that φ(A,B) ≤ P (A↔ B). The probability
P (A−B) is however not trivial to compute. Instead, we use the fact that P (A−B) =
P (∃k − B : ik ∈ g) for some i in a site in A. Since k is connected to B, there are
two possibilities : (1) the distance between k and B is finite, or (2) the distance
between k and B is infinite, and k is reached from B using an infinite number of
links.
We start with the second possibility. In that case, from assumption 9, the rea-
lization on B does not depends on k, hence P (A|B) = P (A).
Now, suppose that the distance between k and B is finite. Then, as in the proof
of proposition 3.4.1, we can write
dT−1φ¯k,l(d) ≤ 2kmdT−1 exp{−1
2
h¯(d)2}
for all d > d¯ for some d¯ > 0. The remaining of the proof is omitted as it is identical
to the proof of proposition 3.4.1. 
Conley’s (1999) estimator
Conley (1999) provides an estimator when X ⊂ R2 and {Zs,m; s ∈ Sm,m ∈ N}
is α-mixing and stationary. This approach has also been recently used by Wang et
al. (2010) in the context of the estimation of a spatial probit. We propose to extend
Conley’s (1999) estimator for X ⊂ RT , where T ≥ 1.
We consider a compact subset of the space of individual characteristics, i.e.
Y ⊂ X . We define a random process Λ on a regular lattice on Y such that Λy = 1
if the location y = (y1, ..., yT ) is sampled, and Λy = 0 otherwise. We assume
that Λ is independent of the underlying random field, has finite expectation, and is
stationary. Intuitively, since the lattice is regular, it gives an idea of the dependence
structure between the observations. Consider Figure 1 below, where X = R2 for
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presentation purposes. Sampled pairs are represented by the black circles.
Figure II.1 – Regular Lattice and Dependence Structure
(a) Uniform Dependence Structure (b) Directed Dependence Structure
In Figure 1a, sites are distributed more or less uniformly in Y . In Figure 1b
however, the dependence structure seems to be more directed. Now, lets define
y¯ = (y¯1, ..., y¯T ) to be the maximal location for Λy in every dimension. Notice that
this quantity is well defined since Y is compact. For instance, for the lattice in
Figure 1, y¯ = (6, 5).
Now, let qˆy(θ) =
1
n(y)
∑
s∈y qs,m(θ), where s ∈ y is a sampled pairs s in location
y, and n(y) is the number of sampled pairs in location y. We define the following
process, for any location y :
Ry(θ) =

∂qˆy
∂θ
(θ) if Λy = 1
0 otherwise
Let m∗ be the number of sampled locations.2 We can now present our proposed
2A simple way to compute m∗ is to count the number of times Λy = 1.
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estimator, based on a generalization of Conley (1999) :
Bm(θ) =
1
m∗
y˜1∑
y1=0
...
y˜T∑
yT=0
y¯1∑
y′1=y1+1
...
y¯T∑
y′T=yT+1
Γy˜(y)
[
Ry′(θ)R
′
y′−y(θ) +Ry′−y(θ)R
′
y′(θ)
]
− 1
m∗
y¯1∑
y1=1
...
y¯T∑
yT=1
Ry(θ)R
′
y(θ) (II.1)
Where y˜ < y¯, and Γy˜(y) is a kernel function. For instance, Conley (1999) pro-
posed to use y˜ = o(y¯1/3), i.e. a bound of the same order as the cubic root of y¯, and
the following Bartlett window kernel :
Γy˜(y) =
(1−
|y1|
y˜1
)...(1− |yT |
y˜T
) for |y1| < y˜1, ..., |yT | < y˜T
0 otherwise
As in the estimation of HAC variances, the precise choice of y˜ and Γy˜(y) will
depend on the specific application. With that regard, we can easily show that the
estimator in (II.1) when T = 1 is equivalent to a HAC estimator.
Lets rewrite the estimator for T = 1 :
Bm(θ) =
2
m
y˜1∑
k=0
y¯1∑
y=k+1
Γy˜(k)Ry(θ)R
′
y−k(θ)−
1
m
y¯1∑
y=1
Ry(θ)R
′
y(θ)
= γˆ(0) + 2
y˜1∑
k=1
Γy˜(k)γˆ(k)
where γˆ(0) = 1
m
∑y¯1
y=0 Ry(θ)R
′
y(θ) is the estimation of the variance of the process
Ry, and γˆ(k) =
1
m
∑y¯1
y=k+1 Ry(θ)R
′
y−k(θ) the estimation of the autocovariance of
the process Ry. Then, in one dimension our proposed estimator become exactly
the HAC variance estimator for the covariance stationary process Ry, using the
Bartlett kernel. In our case here, under some φ mixing conditions we may ensure
that γ(k)→ 0 as k →∞.
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Bester et al. (2012)
Let X be partitioned into groups, or clusters : c = 1, ..., C. Bester et al. (2012)
propose to use the following CV estimator :
Bˆm(θ) =
1
m
∑
s∈S
∑
r∈S
I(cs = cr)
∂qs,m(θ)
∂θ
(
∂qs,m(θ)
∂θ
)′
Where cs is the group in which s ∈ S is located. This is the usual Cluster-Variance
estimator. It has the advantage of being easy and fast to implement. In practice,
the constructions of those groups is not necessarily straightforward. Bester et al.
(2012) recommend to use a relatively small number of large groups. An important
requirement however is a boundary condition which states that most of the pairs
in groups are located in the interior (i.e. not on the boundary) of those groups in
X . Specifically, let ∂(cs) be the boundary of the group cs, and c¯m be the average
number of pairs in a group, then one should have ∂(cs) < c¯
(T−1)/T
m , where T ≥ 1 is
the dimension of X .
Annexe III
Appendix III
Tableau III.I – Descriptive statistics
Course Variable Mean S.D.
French Score 72.647 14.086
(Sec. 5) Age 16.142 0.488
Socio-ec. Index - -
Perc. High 0.328 0.469
Perc. Med. 0.409 0.492
Gender (Female=1) 0.549 0.500
Foreign 0.111 0.310
Secondary 5 0.985 0.120
Number of observations 41778
Number of groups 314
Size of true groups 133.4 115.7
Size of observed groups 133.1 115.4
Science Score 74.689 17.671
(Sec. 4) Age 15.255 0.610
Socio-ec. Index - -
Perc. High 0.338 0.470
Perc. Med. 0.402 0.490
Gender (Female=1) 0.527 0.499
Foreign 0.127 0.333
Secondary 5 0.077 0.267
Number of observations 54981
Number of groups 378
Size of true groups 146.0 134.2
Size of observed groups 145.5 133.7
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Tableau III.I – Descriptive statistics (continued)
Course Variable Mean S.D.
Math † Score 62.088 15.83
(Sec. 5) Age 16.272 0.574
Socio-ec. Index - -
Perc. High 0.303 0.460
Perc. Med. 0.400 0.490
Gender (Female=1) 0.540 0.498
Foreign 0.111 0.314
Secondary 5 0.957 0.202
Number of observations 15771
Number of groups 361
Size of true groups 50.7 49.9
Size of observed groups 49.9 49.7
History Score 70.156 17.280
(Sec. 4) Age 15.230 0.580
Socio-ec. Index - -
Perc. High 0.337 0.473
Perc. Med. 0.403 0.491
Gender (Female=1) 0.533 0.499
Foreign 0.127 0.333
Secondary 5 0.044 0.205
Number of observations 55057
Number of groups 382
Size of true groups 144.6 134.8
Size of observed groups 144.1 134.5
† Math refers to Math 514 (Secondary 5 regular course).
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Tableau III.II – Peer Effects on Student Achievementa
Conditional Maximum Likelihood and Pseudo Conditional Maximum Likelihood
French Science Math History
Endogenous effect 0.296 -0.231 0.827** 0.641
(0.605) (0.414) (0.319) (0.399)
[0.327] [0.234] [0.249] [0.272]
Contextual effects
Age -39.435** -19.493* 0.838 -31.607**
(12.798) (10.237) (9.874) (13.655)
[10.987] [8.893] [7.382] [9.471]
Socio-ec. Index (High) 16.613 8.941 29.310* -6.367
(15.096) (21.637) (15.422) (17.505)
[17.530] [22.454] [15.580] [18.947]
Socio-ec. Index (Medium) -4.765 22.156 18.246 -6.713
(14.907) (18.648) (13.334) (19.207)
[16.870] [17.783] [13.726] [18.565]
Gender (Female=1) -24.870 14.852 15.558* -11.837
(15.927) (13.425) (9.006) (12.633)
[14.393] [12.178] [9.491] [12.413]
Foreign -26.699* -8.844 -2.654 29.148*
(14.828) (13.737) (12.802) (15.304)
[15.861] [16.953] [12.143] [18.007]
Secondary 5 167.926** -0.334 -6.080 24.041
(54.842) (25.048) (39.168) (24.027)
[41.179] [19.956] [26.056] [21.166]
(continued on the next page)
xli
Tableau III.II – Peer Effects on Student Achievement (continued)a
Conditional Maximum Likelihood and Pseudo Conditional Maximum Likelihood
French Science Math History
Individual effects
Age -7.998** -8.293** -4.868** -7.942**
(0.239) (0.269) (0.330) (0.253)
[0.162] [0.151] [0.271] [0.151]
Socio-ec. Index (High) 1.423** 1.609** 2.112** 2.019**
(0.308) (0.297) (0.496) (0.322)
[0.245] [0.268] [0.500] [0.261]
Socio-ec. Index (Medium) 0.670** 0.785** 1.189** 0.795**
(0.266) (0.260) (0.464) (0.272)
[0.220] [0.230] [0.435] [0.234]
Gender (Female=1) 3.807** 0.319 1.018** -1.641**
(0.196) (0.200) (0.325) (0.207)
[0.162] [0.158] [0.301] [0.159]
Foreign -2.596** 2.095** -0.081 0.806**
(0.314) (0.380) (0.513) (0.384)
[0.279] [0.278] [0.548] [0.284]
Secondary 5 10.519** 1.653** 6.474** 3.126**
(1.258) (0.560) (1.096) (0.537)
[0.676] [0.328] [0.767] [0.399]
Log-likelihood -162548.552 -226078.181 -62420.961 -226216.108
Notes :
CML unrobust standard errors in brackets. Pseudo CML robust standard errors in
parentheses.
** indicates 5% significance level, based on robust s.e.
* indicates 10% significance level, based on robust s.e.
aThe dependent variable is the score on June 2005 provincial secondary exams.
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Tableau III.III – Peer Effects on Student Achievementa
2SLS Estimation with Group Fixed Effectb
French Sciences Math History
Endogenous effect 1.378 -0.509 -0.037 0.787
(1.468) (0.764) (0.477) (0.980)
Individual effects
Age -7.690** -7.962** -4.606** -7.609**
(0.197) (0.167) (0.228) (0.163)
Socio-ec. Index (High) 1.373** 1.754** 1.836** 2.041**
(0.242) (0.250) (0.423) (0.248)
Socio-ec. Index (Medium) 0.661** 0.826** 1.069** 0.803**
(0.221) (0.219) (0.365) (0.221)
Gender (Female=1) 3.871** 0.333** 0.965** -1.553**
(0.164) (0.159) (0.265) (0.157)
Foreign -2.514** 2.128** -0.005 0.716**
(0.282) (0.270) (0.496) (0.276)
Secondary 5 9.516** 1.415** 6.674** 2.910**
(0.781) (0.327) (0.741) (0.390)
Contextual effects
Age 4.205 13.496** 6.713** 8.552**
(4.845) (3.050) (1.712) (4.036)
Socio-ec. Index (High) 7.364 30.997* 15.962** -6.246
(17.305) (16.678) (7.641) (15.620)
Socio-ec. Index (Medium) -7.103 26.344* 13.501* -8.047
(16.813) (13.908) (7.555) (14.598)
Gender (Female=1) -21.310* 15.637 13.237** 0.567
(12.261) (12.202) (5.808) (11.708)
Foreign -15.732 -2.232 -0.065 19.385
(12.571) (11.449) (7.189) (12.903)
Secondary 5 40.184 -17.370 7.825 2.537
(36.380) (14.470) (21.360) (23.060)
Sargan Test 23.52 0.54 1.40 5.35
[ p-value ] [0.00] [1.00] [0.97] [0.50]
Stock and Yogo Test 706.84 1055.92 464.43 660.40
[ Critical Value for b=0.05
at sign. level of 5% ] [18.37] [18.37] [18.37] [18.37]
Notes :
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** indicates 5% significance level
* indicates 10% significance level
aThe dependent variable is the score on June 2005 provincial secondary exams.
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Tableau III.V – Simulations Calibrated on French Sample
(1000 replications)
CML 2SLS G2SLS OLS
Endogenous effect 0.391 -0.873 0.495 -33.571
(0.101) (0.852) (167.702) (3.688)
Individual effects
Age -8.002 -7.920 -8.006 -5.758
(0.145) (0.149) (10.021) (0.545)
Gender (Female=1) 3.798 3.822 3.828 4.480
(0.147) (0.139) (1.693) (0.554)
Contextual effects
Age -39.996 -38.085 -39.540 17.373
(9.996) (7.579) (167.394) (76.788)
Gender (Female=1) -25.329 -16.703 -21.857 210.526
(10.733) (10.092) (692.625) (74.714)
Notes : Average standard errors are in parentheses. The group sizes
are calibrated on our French sample. σ2 = σˆ2 (calibrated)= 154.704.
True value of parameters : Endogenous effect : 0.35 ; Individual effects
- Age : -8 ; Individual effects - Gender : 3.8 ; Contextual effects - Age :
-40 ; Contextual effects - Gender : -25.
xlv
Tableau III.VI – Peer Effects on Student Achievementa
Pseudo Conditional Maximum Likelihood (constrained)
French Science Math History
Endogenous effect 0.297 -0.31 0.801** 0.655
(0.610) (0.399) (0.300) (0.405)
Individual effects
Age -8.011** -8.297** -4.884** -7.908**
(0.238) (0.266) (0.267) (0.247)
Socio-ec. Index (High) 1.314** 1.536** 1.845** 2.062**
(0.264) (0.255) (0.487) (0.290)
Socio-ec. Index (Medium) 0.698** 0.636** 0.818** 0.842**
(0.217) (0.220) (0.374) (0.231)
Gender (Female=1) 3.983** 0.221 1.026** -1.563**
(0.150) (0.173) (0.326) (0.179)
Foreign -2.537** 2.156** 0 0.812**
(0.306) (0.349) (0.439) (0.385)
Secondary 5 10.499** 1.657** 6.571** 2.944**
(1.258) (0.517) (0.861) (0.498)
Contextual effects
Age -41.056** -20.456* - -27.305**
(12.476) (11.646) (11.887)
Socio-ec. Index (High) - - 17.124 -
(15.546)
Socio-ec. Index (Medium) - - - -
Gender (Female=1) - - 16.215* -
(9.087)
Foreign -19.559 - - 29.865**
(11.969) (15.082)
Secondary 5 165.537** - - -
(54.645)
Log-likelihood -162551.11 -226079.659 -62421.964 -226217.241
Likelihood Ratiob 5.122* 2.864 2.006 2.262
Notes :
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** indicates 5% significance level
* indicates 10% significance level
aThe dependent variable is the score on June 2005 provincial secondary exams.
b The LR statistic is used to test the joint equality to zero of contextual effects that are
not individually significant (at 10%) in the pseudo CML unconstrained version (see
Table 2).
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Tableau III.VII – Peer Effects on Student Achievementa
Generalized 2SLS Estimationb
French Sciences Math History
Endogenous effect -2.104 -0.015 -0.162 -2.753
(3.619) (0.734) (0.465) (1.717)
Individual effects
Age -7.390** -8.012** -4.582** -7.306**
(0.348) (0.165) (0.227) (0.203)
Socio-ec. Index (High) 1.542** 1.718** 1.844** 2.222**
(0.293) (0.251) (0.421) (0.250)
Socio-ec. Index (Medium) 0.867** 0.803** 1.080** 0.921**
(0.293) (0.220) (0.362) (0.219)
Gender (Female=1) 3.770** 0.318** 0.966** -1.536**
(0.186) (0.161) (0.264) (0.150)
Foreign -2.568** 2.144** 0.006 0.642**
(0.283) (0.273) (0.494) (0.268)
Secondary 5 9.797** 1.471** 6.701** 2.560**
(0.799) (0.327) (0.739) (0.393)
Contextual effects
Age 15.211 11.514** 7.014** 22.639**
(11.684) (2.967) (1.646) (6.808)
Socio-ec. Index (High) 31.802 25.140 16.299** 25.748
(30.455) (16.904) (7.431) (18.608)
Socio-ec. Index (Medium) 21.574 23.091 14.010* 10.015
(31.981) (14.514) (7.338) (14.788)
Gender (Female=1) -20.267* 13.639 13.265** -1.936
(11.040) (12.713) (5.676) (9.533)
Foreign -28.226 -1.320 0.354 9.226
(18.593) (12.377) (7.041) (12.411)
Secondary 5 79.885* -12.062 9.953 -31.537
(46.845) (15.235) (21.115) (20.155)
Notes :
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** indicates 5% significance level
* indicates 10% significance level
aThe dependent variable is the score on June 2005 provincial secondary exams.
